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Essays on Firms' Behavior in International Trade
with Vertical Specialization
Madhura Maitra
My dissertation consists of three essays that allow me to investigate two related
trade induced economic phenomena  processing trade and offshoring  using di-
verse datasets and theory. In Chapter 1, a joint work with Mi Dai and Miaojie Yu
from Peking University, we solve the documented puzzle that exporters in China are
less productive than non-exporters in the labor intensive sectors and in the Foreign
Invested Enterprises (FIE). We show that this anomalous finding is entirely driven
by firms that engage only in export processing  the activity of assembling tariff
exempted imported inputs into final goods for resale in the foreign markets. We find
that pure processing exporters are less productive than non-exporters, but other types
of exporters  those doing only non-processing trade and those doing both process-
ing and non-processing trade  have superior performance relative to non-exporters.
Our results show that distinguishing between processing and ordinary exporters is
crucial for understanding firm-level exporting behavior in China. In Chapter 2, a
joint work with Henrik Bursland Fosse, from Copenhagen Business School, we inves-
tigate the effects of offshoring on wages. Offshoring firms are found to pay higher
average wages than purely domestic firms. We provide a unifying empirical approach
by capturing the different channels through which offshoring may explain this wage
difference: (i) due to a change in the composition of workers (skill composition effect)
(ii) because all existing workers get higher pay (rent sharing effect). Using Danish
worker-firm data we explain how much each channel contributes to higher wages. To
estimate the causal effect of offshoring on wages we use China's accession to the WTO
in December 2001 and the soon after boom in Chinese exports as positive exogenous
shocks to the incentive to offshore to China. Both skill composition and rent sharing
effects are found to be important in explaining the resultant gain in wages. We also
show that the firm's timing in the offshoring process determines the relative impor-
tance of a channel. For firms offshoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999, only rent
sharing explains the gain in wages. However, for firms offshoring to China both before
and after China's WTO accession the wage increase is explained more by the skill
composition effect. Moreover, these patterns are not discernable from the measures
of skill composition and rent sharing available in typical firm level datasets such
as ratio of educated to uneducated workers and sales per employee. In Chapter 3, I
extend the Sethupathy (2008) model to investigate the wage effects of offshoring in
the presence of heterogeneous firms, heterogeneous workers, and imperfections in the
labor market with rent sharing. The salient features of the model are: first, there are
heterogeneous firms who differ in terms of productivity; second, presence of heteroge-
neous workers who vary at the skill level; third, imperfect labor market with presence
of search costs, wage bargaining leading to rent sharing between firms and workers;
fourth, performance of high-skilled and low-skilled tasks are required for production
of the good; fifth, there is opportunity for offshoring each type of task, requiring a
marginal cost that varies with the degree of non-routineness of the task and a fixed
cost. In this framework I show that a fall in the cost of offshoring increases average
wage in the offshoring firm due to a rent sharing effect. This effect can be further
reinforced or weakened by an accompanying skill composition effect. Average wages
in the non-offshoring firms decline due to a rent sharing effect only; there is no skill
composition effect for these firms in the model.
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in China? The Role of Processing
Trade1
1.1 Introduction
The nature of international trade has changed  as Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) put it: It's not wine for cloth anymore. In the modern world, with
rapid progress of communication and technology, production processes increasingly
involve global supply chains spanning multiple countries, with different stages of the
production taking place in several disparate locations. A particular form of this
fragmented production technique is processing trade: the activity of assembling tariff
exempted imported inputs into final goods for resale in the foreign markets. The
iPhone is a classic example: the different components of an iPhone are manufactured
in Japan, Korea, Germany, US, and Taiwan from where these are shipped to China
for the final assembly at Foxconn, an exclusive iPhone assembler located in Shenzhen,
1This Chapter is written jointly with Mi Dai and Miaojie Yu from the Peking
University.
2China. All final assembled products are exported back to the US and other markets
(Xing, 2011). In terms of its sheer magnitude processing trade in China merits special
attention. Processing trade accounts for nearly half of China's exports, exceeding
total exports for most countries except Germany and USA. Processing / assembly has
become popular in other developing countries. In 2006, 130 countries had established
3500 Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which employed 66 million people in total. For
many countries (Kenya, Malaysia, Argentina, etc.), exports from EPZs accounted for
over 80 percent of their total exports (International Labor Office, 2007).
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the first to study the per-
formance of processing firms vis-à-vis non-processing ones. We demonstrate that
processing exporters in China are fundamentally different from the traditional ex-
porters, who are found to be exceptional performers for a wide range of countries
and measures. Most studies analyzing exporter behavior in China fail to distinguish
between the two2; however we show that accounting for this difference is crucial. In
fact, if all exporters are treated the same in China, a puzzling result emerges: con-
trary to the accumulated evidence in the literature, exporters are no longer superior
performers (documented by Lu et al., 2010 and Lu, 2010). We show that this finding
is entirely driven by processing exporters. Other types of exporters  those doing
only non-processing trade and those doing both processing and non-processing trade
 have the usual superior performance relative to non-exporters.
In this paper we merge the Chinese Manufacturing Survey data, which pro-
vides all firm level information (except firms' processing status), with the Chinese
Customs data, which allows us to distinguish firms according to whether or not they
engage in processing trade. Our main findings are: (1) processing exporters are less
productive than both non-processing exporters and non-exporters. (2) It is crucial to
account for processing trade separately. Once processing exporters are accounted for,
2Papers like Park et al. (2010), Yang and Mallick (2010), Girma et al. (2009), Lu et al. (2010,
2011), Lu (2010) do not distinguish between processing and non-processing exporters  exceptions
being Yu (2011), Manova and Zhang (2011).
3the productivity abnormalities documented in previous research (Lu et al., 2010 and
Lu, 2010) are eliminated or alleviated. (3) Processing exporters have the lowest prof-
its per worker, pay lowest wages per worker, have lowest price per unit of exports, are
relatively smaller in terms of sales, and have lower capital intensity. Moreover, pro-
cessing exporters are concentrated in labor intensive sectors and in Foreign Invested
Enterprises (henceforth FIE).
Our results show that not only are processing exporters consistently performing
worse than non-processing exporters, but failing to consider the two types of exporters
separately make performance of exporters appear worse than non-exporters  even
though non-processing exporters' performance is similar to what has been widely doc-
umented in the literature. It is thus essential to treat processing and non-processing
exporters separately; and henceforth, studies of export performance in China (or
countries with large processing trade sectors such as Mexico and Vietnam) should
account for this distinction.
We investigate possible explanations behind low productivity of processing
exporters. The theories are classified into two groups: (1) Processing exporters are
actually less productive. (2) Processing exporters may appear less productive in the
data due to measurement issues, for example, if their pricing policy leads to lower
revenue or value added which gets translated into lower revenue based productivity
measures. The mechanism consistent with the first idea is that processing trade is
a different activity compared to ordinary trade. Our data shows that processing
exporters are different in all dimensions. These exporters are the least profitable, pay
lowest wages per worker  indicating that they hire relatively unskilled labor, and
are less capital intensive. We also find that processing firms have lowest price per
unit of export. This is consistent with the idea that the products exported by them
are different (for example, low quality products which fetch lower price and revenue
and yields lower profits) than those exported by the other exporters. Given that
4processing firms pay lower fixed cost3 it makes sense that only the low productive
firms would select into processing trade.
Mechanisms consistent with the second idea are as follows: first, transfer pric-
ing by foreign owned processing exporters can make them appear less productive, a
result much less pronounced in non-foreign firms where processing exporters are no
less productive than non-exporters. Our data provides mixed evidence for the hy-
pothesis that transfer pricing leads to low productivity of foreign owned processing
exporters. Second, processing trade firms receive contracts from foreign firms to pro-
duce the final product. However, the foreign firm owns the patent or blue print of the
product and can squeeze the processing exporters' markup and make them behave as
price takers  this can lead to lower revenue and hence low measured productivity.
Controlling for market power (levels of export, firm size, markup and industry market
share are used as proxies for market power) in the baseline regression does not alter
our main result. Thus low market power is not driving the low productivity of these
firms. In summary, our results imply that processing trade involves unskilled labor
intensive jobs having low profitability and production of low quality goods. The fact
that processing firms receive govt. tax benefits implies that processing activity has
lower fixed cost. This means that low productive firms select into doing only process-
ing trade whereas high productive firms would do both processing and non-processing
trade. The productivity ranking of different types of exporters in our data supports
this hypothesis.
Our paper is related to the firm level trade literature analyzing the behavior
of exporters. It is closely related to two papers documenting counter-Melitz findings
in Chinese exporters. The first paper by Lu et al. (2010), shows that the anomalous
result is true only for firms with foreign investments. The second one by Lu (2010)
finds that exporters are less productive than non-exporters only in labor intensive
3Fixed cost is lower for processing exports since: (i) the foreign buyer is responsible for market-
ing and distribution of the final processed product, and (ii) the government offers easier customs
clearance procedures for processing trade in EPZs.
5sectors. Their explanations do not take into account the role of processing trade.
Here we match the firm level data used in the two prior works to the Chinese customs
data4. The merged data can replicate the prior results; but more importantly it allows
us to identify a firm's processing status. We show that the fundamental distinction
that matters for the counter-Melitz result is neither foreign investment nor labor
intensity, but rather participation in processing trade; because processing exporters
are least productive.
This paper is also related to the literature studying global supply chains since
processing trade is a special form of vertical specialization. Though many papers, both
theory and empirical, have studied vertical specialization and supply chains (Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996; Hummels et al., 1998; Hummels et al., 2001; Yi , 2003; Feenstra
and Hanson, 2005; Hanson et al., 2005; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Costinot
et al., 2011; Johnson and Noguera, 2011, etc.), none of these papers have investigated
the agents who are the conduits of supply chains from a developing country's point
of view  we fill this gap. Lastly, our work is closely related to the literature doc-
umenting the special nature of processing trade. Bergin et al. (2008), show that
processing industries in Mexico (Maquiladora) are subject to higher volatility. The
paper by Koopman et al. (2008) shows that using traditional methods for calculating
value added for countries that actively engage in processing trade can overestimate
the domestic content of these countries' exports. Yu (2011) shows that due to input
tariff exemption policy on processing trade, the effect of input tariff reduction on firm
productivity is small in China. We show that processing exporters are less productive,
and account for the abnormal productivity of Chinese exporters. Our results imply
that an increase in processing firms has re-allocation effects opposite to the Melitz
(2003) prediction  it reduces average productivity of the sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
4The firm level data does not provide any information about the firms' processing status. This
information is available from the customs data; hence using the merged data is crucial.
6provides several stylized facts about processing exporters in China and relates them
to the productivity abnormality documented about Chinese exporters. Section 4
provides discussion about possible theories that explain processing exporters' unex-
ceptional performance and how well they are supported by the data. The last section
concludes.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Firm Level Data
The firm level data in this paper comes from Annual Surveys of Manufacturing
Firms conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China from 2000 to 2005.
The survey includes all State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and those Non-State Owned
Enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about 650,000 US dollars) or more.
The dataset includes information from balance sheet, profit and loss and cash flow
statements of firms, includes about 80 variables, and provides detailed information
on firm's identification, ownership, export status, employment, capital stock, revenue,
which are of particular use in this paper. These firms contribute about 98% of total
Chinese manufacturing exports in the aggregate trade data. To clean the data, fol-
lowing Feenstra et al. (2011), we drop observations that report missing or negative
values for any of the following variables: total sales, total revenue, total employment,
fixed capital, export value, intermediate inputs, if export value exceeds total sales or
if share of foreign asset exceeds one. We include firms with at least eight employees.
However, this data provides no information about a firm's processing status.
1.2.2 Transactions Level Customs Data
The transactions level customs data comes from China's General Administra-
tion of Customs and spans from 2000-2005. It contains disaggregate product level
7information of firms' trading price, quantity and value at the HS8 digit level. Impor-
tantly, this data provides information on whether a transaction was processing or not
 we construct firms' processing status from this dataset. We divide exporting firms
into three types depending on their nature of transactions in a given year: (1) pro-
cessing firms: who only engage in processing transactions; (2) non-processing firms:
who only make non-processing transactions; (3) both: if a firm makes both processing
and non-processing transactions.
1.2.3 Combining the Two Datasets
Combining the firm level data with the transactions level data is problematic
because the firm identifiers used in the two datasets are different  a nine digit id
in the firm level data vs. an eleven digit id in the customs data, with no common
elements. Following Yu (2011), we merge the two datasets by using zip codes and
the last seven digits of a firm's phone number. The details of the merge variables are
provided in Appendix A.1. We are able to merge about 30% of the exporters in the
firm level data with the transactions data. One possible issue is selection, since we
lose quite a few exporters5. Table 1.1 shows the comparison of exporters in the firm
level data that could be matched with the customs data to those that could not be
matched. We see that the merged exports look slightly bigger on average compared
to the unmerged exporters. Moreover we show in the Appendix B.1 that the merged
data can replicate the counter Melitz finding documented in the previous literature.
Table A.1 shows that exporters are less productive than non-exporters within foreign
owned firms. Table 1.6a shows that in terms of value added per worker, exporters
5We have run all our regressions using only the firm level data by dividing exporters into two
types: regular exporters (who sell domestically as well as export) and pure exporters (who only
export). We find that pure exporters are highly correlated with processing exporters and that pure
exporters are the least productive. The reason we prefer to use the merged data is that we find
around 30% of pure exporters are doing non-processing trade only, and they are not less productive
than non-exporters. This result implies that the processing status (as opposed to export intensity)
of a firm is crucial in determining its productivity.
8are less productive in the labor intensive sectors. However in Table A.2b using value
added per worker as our dependant variable and controling for size and in Table A.2c
using TFP (Olley-Pakes) measures we find no such evidence6. One explanation for
the difference in results when using the two different productivity measures without
controlling for size could be that value added per worker ignores the role of capital
but is sensitive to capital intensity. Thus higher capital intensity mechanically leads
to higher value added per worker.
1.3 Stylized Facts about Processing Exporters
1.3.1 China's Export-Processing Regime
The Chinese government has been actively promoting export processing since
the 1980s. There are altogether 16 specific types of processing trade in China, but two
of them are more common: processing with supplied materials (henceforth PWSM)
and processing with imported materials (henceforth PWIM)7. For PWSM, a Chinese
firm obtains raw materials and parts from its foreign trading partners without making
any payments. After processing/assembly, the product is sold back to the firm who
provided the parts and materials. The processing firm only charges a processing
fee on the foreign firm8. By contrast, for PWIM, the Chinese firm pays for the
imported materials. It also has the freedom to choose the export destination of the
6Similar results are also obtained when we use firm level data only.
7PWSM also refers to pure assembly in Feenstra and Hanson (2005) and processing with
assembly as adopted in Yu (2011). Correspondingly, PWIM is also called input and assembly
and processing with inputs.
8The measurement of TFP for PWSM firms is problematic since they do not report value of
the intermediate inputs supplied from abroad in their accounting statements and the output value
reported is not the total value of the final output but just the processing fee charged. However,
PWSM firms account for less than 5% of all exporters in our data and separating exporters by
their detailed processing status shows that both pure PWSM and pure PWIM exporters are less
productive than non-exporters (tables not reported). This alleviates the worry that bias in measuring
TFP for PWSM firms is driving our result.
9final processed product.
Export processing in China is subject to very different policy treatment com-
pared to non-processing trade. First, processing activities enjoy favorable taxation.
The amount of imported inputs actually used in the making of the finished products
for export is exempt from tariffs and import-related taxes. All processed finished
products for export are also exempt from export tariffs and value-added tax9. Sec-
ond, the finished products using the tax-exempted materials have to be re-exported,
and enterprises are not allowed to sell the tax-exempted materials and parts or fin-
ished products in China10, 11.
Although processing trade is defined as importing materials and re-exporting
the finished products, it should be noted that not all transactions that involve im-
porting and re-exporting are treated as processing trade. A transaction is recorded
as processing/assembly by the Customs, and taxes are exempt (or rebated) only if a
firm with legal processing status declares the transaction to be processing. In order
to get processing status, a firm needs to: first, obtain the Processing Trade Approval
Certificate from the Commerce Authorities; and second, should then present the Pro-
cessing Trade Approval Certificate and Processing Trade Contract to the Customs
Office where the processing firm is located to complete the filing and registration
formalities and to apply for the Processing Trade Registration Handbook. A trans-
action will be recorded as processing only if a firm declares it to be processing to the
Customs by filling out the registration handbook.
9The taxation policy for PWSM and PWIM are slightly different. For PWSM, import and output
tariffs are never levied, for PWIM, however, tariffs on the imported materials are first levied, but
then rebated to the firm upon re-exporting of the final products.
10If such goods have to be sold in the domestic market for special reasons, approval must be
obtained from the commerce authorities in charge of processing trade at the provincial level as well
as the Customs authorities. If approved to sell domestically, the processing firm must pay all the
related taxes plus interest payments.
11The difference in tax policies for the processing and non-processing firms can potentially affect




We start by showing the importance of processing exports in total Chinese ex-
ports. From Table 1.2 we see that over the sample period, approximately 20% of firms
were processing exporters only and around 40% each were engaged in non-processing
trade or in both types of activities, respectively. In terms of export value, pure pro-
cessing exporters contribute about 30% of total exports. In Table 1.3 we report the
distribution of processing intensity  defined as the share of processing exports in
total exports  of firms doing both activities. The average processing intensity is
higher in FIE firms (in terms of mean and median) compared to non-FIEs. Our data
shows that processing trade is concentrated more in FIEs (Foreign Invested Enter-
prises), with over 80% of the total export value coming from processing trade. For the
non-foreign firms, processing trade accounts for only about 30% of the total exports12.
Figure 1.1 shows that processing intensity is higher in labor intensive sectors13, 14.
The fact that processing exports are concentrated in FIEs and in labor intensive sec-
tors suggest that the low productivity of exporters in these sectors found in previous
studies is possibly being driven by low productivity of processing exporters; and in
the next sub-section we will show that is indeed true. Figure 1.2 plots productivity
by processing intensity. We find that exporters with processing intensity one (doing
only processing trade) have significantly lower productivity than those with process-
ing intensity zero (doing non-processing trade only). Exporters with low processing
intensity are more productive than non-processing firms but productivity generally
declines as firms' processing intensity increase.
12Table not reported.
13The correlation between processing intensity and sector capital labor ratio is -0.7.
14The capital labor ratio is defined as the median capital labor ratio in a two digit industry.
Results are qualitatively similar if we use the aggregate capital labor ratio of the industry instead.
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1.3.3 Econometric Analysis
In order to examine the performance of processing exporters versus non-processing
exporters and non-exporters, we estimate the following equation:
yijpt = α + β1PXijpt + β2NPXijpt + β3BXijpt + ijpt (1.1)
Where yijpt is the dependent variable of interest (in logs) for firm i in industry j,
province p and time t. PXijptis a dummy which equals one if firm is a processing
exporter (i.e. in any given year these firms only report processing transactions);
NPXijpt is the dummy for non-processing exporters (i.e. in any given year these
firms only report non-processing transactions); BXijpt is the dummy for exporters
doing both processing and non-processing trade (i.e. in any year the firms report
both processing and non-processing transactions); D stands for industry, province
and year fixed effects and in some robustness specifications other controls like size
and ownership. Our main variables of interest are productivity, including total factor
productivity (TFP) measures and labor productivity measures such as value added
per worker. We will show most of our results using TFP (Olley-Pakes) measure15, 16,
as it takes into account both the role of capital and the simultaneity of productivity
shocks and input selection (issues ignored by value added per worker measure. Equa-
tion 1.1 is our baseline regression, it allows us to know if lower productivity of one
or all types of exporters is important for explaining the documented unexceptional
exporter performance in China.
We carry out regression 1.1 using value added per worker and TFP as our pro-
ductivity measures. The results are reported in Table 1.4. We find that in terms of all
productivity measures processing exporters are less productive than non-exporters;
the coefficient of processing dummy being negative and significant. The results in-
15Details of construction of TFP using Olley-Pakes method is provided in A.2.
16Results are similar using other measures of productivity and briefly discussed in the Robustness
section.
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dicate that processing exporters are 4% to 30% less productive than non-exporters.
Consistent with Melitz (2003) model, non-processing exporters and exporters doing
both processing and non-processing trade are more productive than non-exporters.
This table makes it clear that only the processing exporters demonstrate counter-
Melitz productivity pattern. We also find that productivity decreases with process-
ing intensity, indicating that less productive firms engage in processing trade more
intensively17.
We next investigate productivity of the different exporters by ownership: namely
FIE and non-FIE firms, since previous literature has demonstrated low productivity
of exporters in foreign owned firms18. Table 1.5 shows that irrespective of ownership
type, processing exporters are the least productive of all exporters. Moreover, among
FIEs it is only processing exporters that are less productive than non-exporters.
Other types of exporters: those doing both processing and non-processing exports
and those doing only non-processing exports have the usual superior performance of
exporters  these firms are more productive than non-exporters. Thus the finding
that exporters are less productive than non-exporters in foreign owned firms is being
driven by inferior productivity of processing exporters.
We now check how much the anomalous behavior of exporters in the labor
intensive sectors documented by Lu (2010) is influenced by the low productivity of
processing exporters. We run the baseline regressions by capital intensity of the sector
(low, medium or high capital intensity). Following Lu (2010) we define the capital
intensity of a sector at the 2 digit industry level as the median capital-labor ratio in
the sector.
In Table 1.6a we look at labor productivity (in terms of value added per worker)
17Table not provided in this paper but available upon request.
18We use two methods to identify a firm's ownership type. In the first method, we use the self-
reported registration type of the firm, and in the second we calculate a firm's share of stocks owned
by foreign partners. Following the definition from the National Bureau of Statistics, we define FIE
to be a firm with over 25% foreign-owned stocks. The two methods yield qualitatively the same
results, so we only report results using the first method.
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of different types of exporters across capital intensity of the sectors and find that all
exporters are less productive in the labor and medium intensity sector. However
processing exporters are the least productive irrespective of the capital intensity of
the sector; the co-efficient always being negative and significant. In Table A.2b in
the appendix we show that the pattern for value added changes considerably once we
control for firm size. Exporters in general become more productive than non-exporters
in all sectors. Processing exporters, however, still remain the least productive, though
the other two types of exporters become more productive than non-exporters, once
we control for firm size19. From the discussion it is obvious that the poor labor
productivity found in Lu (2010) is in part being driven by low labor productivity of
processing exporters. We note that value-added per worker does not adjust for the role
of capital but is positively correlated to the level of capital, hence labor productivity
is mechanically higher in sectors and firms that use capital more intensively20, 21.
To take into account the role of capital, we repeat the same exercise using TFP
and report the results in Table 1.6b. We find positive and statistically significant
coefficient for all exporters except processing traders, indicating that the former are
always more productive (in terms of TFP) than non-exporters irrespective of industry
capital intensity. We still find that the behavior of processing exporters is starkly
different. They have lower TFP compared to the other exporters regardless of sectors
and are less productive than non-exporters except in capital intensive sectors. Table
1.7 shows that similar results hold for the subsample of FIE firms.
Another feature of Chinese exporters is that around 30% of them are pure
exporters i.e. they export their entire output. Lu (2010) predicts that pure exporters
19The results by different exporter types after controlling for size is not reported.
20The correlation between labor productivity and capital labor ratio in our data is 0.35, while the
correlation between TFP(Olley-Pakes) and capital labor ratio is only 0.02.This means that TFP is
much less correlated with capital labor ratio and is therefore a cleaner measure of productivity.
21Moreover in China labor share is only around 50%, hence we should use productivity measures
that account for the different factors of production.
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are less productive than non-exporters in labor intensive sectors. Lu et al. (2010)
also predicts that pure exporters are less productive than non-exporters within FIEs.
To check if pure exporters are less productive, we re-run our baseline regressions
by introducing six types of regressors: for each type of processing status we divide
the firms into whether it is a pure exporter (has export intensity one) or a regular
exporter (has export intensity between zero and one). Table 1.8 shows that pure
exporters doing processing trade are the least productive, whereas pure exporters
doing non-processing trade are more productive than non-exporters, irrespective of
ownership type. Table 1.9 shows even in labor intensive sectors pure exporters doing
non-processing trade are not less productive than non-exporters. These results imply
that only processing trade firms have counter Melitz properties.
1.3.4 Robustness
In this section we perform a number of checks on the baseline specification to
test the robustness of our findings. First, to ensure that our results are not entirely
driven by firm size we include control for firm size (in terms of employment) and
ownership in our regression analysis. The results are reported in Table 1.10, column
1. In column 2 we control for industry-province-year fixed effects to account for
industry-province-year specific shocks. Pooling over the years might confound our
results since China was undergoing changes in the post WTO accession period. So
in column 3 we run the regression only for the last year in our sample  2005, by
which time China had met most of its WTO obligations. In column 4 we weight each
firm by its industry value added share, so that large firms receive more weight in
the regressions. Column 5 runs our baseline regressions after trimming the top and
bottom 1% of the data to ensure that extreme values are not driving our results.
We have also re-run our regressions using alternative methods of construct-
ing TFP such as the OLS technique, the system GMM approach by Blundell and
Bond (1998), the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method of constructing TFP, and the
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physical productivity measure used by Hsieh and Klenow (2009)22.
In all the above cases the results are qualitatively similar to our baseline results
reported in Table 1.4  in that processing exporters are the least productive.
1.4 Possible Explanations for Unexceptional Perfor-
mance of Processing Exporters
The results in section 1.3.3 show that processing exporters are not excep-
tional performers. In this section we provide possible explanations for their poor
performance. Since we are using revenue based productivity measures, the possible
explanations can be broadly classified into two groups: (1) processing exporters are
actually less productive; (2) measurement issues may make them appear less produc-
tive. These exporters may appear less productive if their pricing policy results in lower
revenue or value added which gets translated into lower revenue based productivity
measures.
We begin by discussing why processing exporters might be actually less pro-
ductive than non-exporters. In the data we find that processing exporters are different
in all dimensions. Table 1.11 shows that within industries, processing exporters are
the least profitable; pay lowest wages per worker indicating that they hire relatively
unskilled labor; are less capital intensive; and have the lowest per unit price of exports
implying they export low quality products. Figure 1.1 shows that across industries
processing exporters are concentrated more in labor intensive industries. The data
thus indicates that processing trade is a different activity: that it uses relatively un-
skilled labor intensive technology to produce low quality product which also yields
lower profits23. Coupled with this the fact that processing firms receive govt. tax
22Results using the alternative productivity measures are not reported but available upon request.
23These firms would be able to survive with lower productivity and by paying lower wages if there
is product differentiation and firms make efficient use of their resources. The fact that the processing
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benefits imply that processing has lower fixed cost. Hence only low productive firms
become pure processing exporters24. Most productive firms would do both processing
and non-processing trade. This hypothesis is supported by the productivity ranking
of the different exporters in Table 1.425.
We now move on to discuss how processing exporters might appear to be less
productive due to measurement issues. In our baseline results by ownership in Table
1.5, we find that the low productivity of processing firms is very pronounced in FIEs
but not so much in non-foreign firms. Foreign owned processing firms through transfer
pricing can potentially repatriate profits to a related party located in countries with
lower tax rates. They can transfer profits by either selling their output to a related
party at a low price or by purchasing inputs from a related party at a high price26.
Since our productivity measures are revenue based, firms engaging in this form of
transfer pricing can appear less productive than they actually are. It might be easier
for foreign processing firms to set prices differently for intra-company transactions
since there are often no natural benchmarks for the goods exported and imported by
processing exporters. Unfortunately, the data does not provide any information to
compare prices of similar goods sold to a related party and those sold to unaffiliated
buyers to have direct evidence regarding the nature of transfer pricing. We rely on
indirect information to check if transfer pricing is driving the low productivity of
exporters use relatively more unskilled labor and produce low quality goods can create downward bias
our TFP measures since we treat labor and output as homogeneous when constructing productivity
and thus these firms appear less productive though they are using inputs efficiently.
24Yu (2011) also finds that low-productive firms self-select to engage in processing trade.
25The possibility that processing exporters are doing a different activity implies that we should
not be using the same production function for processing and non-processing firms. In this paper
we use TFP measures widely used in the literature to establish the fact that the anomalous results
previously reported is being driven by processing exporters and not by a new method of estimating
TFP. However, as an additional check we have carried out TFP estimation by assuming different
production functions for processing and non-processing firms and have obtained qualitatively similar
results (tables not reported).
26Other ways of repatriating profits could be in the form of royalty payment or license fees that
can keep profits low in the host country.
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foreign owned processing exporters.
As mentioned before, transfer pricing by foreign owned processing firms can
explain why the low productivity for processing exporters is very prominent for FIE
firms. Next we check if systematic relationship exists between profitability and the
degree of differentiation of goods among the different types of exporter. Profit repa-
triation through transfer pricing should be more prominent in sectors that have more
differentiated goods since finding a comparable product is relatively more difficult in
such sectors. Thus, if processing exporters are repatriating profits through transfer
pricing, the difference in profits should be higher in the differentiated goods sectors.
Table 1.12 compares profitability of non-exporters and the different types of exporters
by import elasticity of the sectors. We use Broda and Weinstein (2006) import elas-
ticity measures and divide goods into 3 types: those with high, medium and low
elasticity; the latter being the most differentiated sector. Table 13 provides evidence
consistent with profit repatriation through transfer pricing by FIEs. For these firms
the gap in profits between non-exporters and processing exporters is the biggest in
the low elasticity sector. No similar pattern can be found in non-FIE profitability
difference between processing exporters and non-exporters27.
Table 1.11 column 4 shows that input per unit of sales are the lowest for
processing firms. This is at odds with the transfer pricing hypothesis, since firms
engaged in repatriating profits abroad would want to push up the price of inputs and
push down the price of the final goods, thus on average having higher inputs per
unit of sales. It is possible that these firms are repatriating profits by using other
methods that depress the profits (like royalty payment and license fees). Though we
cannot rule out the role of transfer pricing behind the low productivity of foreign
27A similar comparison of unit value of exports shows no systematic pattern between ownership
and degree of differentiability of the sector. This is at odds with the transfer pricing hypothesis 
we would expect prices for FIE processing exporters to be lower in the differentiated goods sector
where opportunity of setting prices differently for intra-company transactions is the biggest (table
not reported).
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owned processing exporters based on these evidence, it does not appear to be the
sole driving mechanism. We must keep in mind that the FIE non-exporters are most
likely practicing horizontal FDI, and are likely to be more productive than the typical
non-exporter in the Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004) type model. Viewed in this light,
the fact that processing exporters are less productive than non-exporters particularly
for foreign owned firms is not very surprising.
Low market power of processing exporters is also consistent with why these
firms may appear to be less productive than non-exporters. These firms receive
contracts from foreign firms, and the foreign firm owns the patent or blue print of
the products hence can squeeze the processing/assembly unit's mark up and make
them behave as price takers, which can lead to their low value added and revenue.
We use levels of export, firm size, markup and industry market share as different
proxies for market power. Following Keller and Yeaple (2009), markup is proxied by
revenue over revenue less profits, and market size is proxied by share of firm's sale
in total industry sales28. Table 1.13 shows that the productivity difference between
processing traders and other types of firms exist even after controlling market power.
Based on this evidence it appears that the low productivity of processing firms are
not driven by their low market power.
In summary we can say that though different mechanisms can explain our
result, the hypothesis that processing trade is a different activity  these are unskilled
intensive jobs, yielding low profits, involve lower fixed costs and produces low quality
products  compared to non-processing trade is the one that receives considerable
support from the data.
28The data shows that processing exporters are smaller in terms of sales, markup and market size,
so are likely to have less market power and would be easier to bargain with (table not reported).
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1.5 Conclusion
Processing trade, in which parts are sourced globally and assembled at one
place to be shipped to the final destination, explains bulk of the trade for the exporting
powerhouse  China. This paper, merging Chinese firm level data with the customs
data, provides new stylized facts about performance of processing exporters. We
show that processing exporters are fundamentally different from non-processing firms.
The firm level trade literature usually finds exporters to be exceptional performers.
However, some recent papers on China document exporters to be less productive than
non-exporters, both among foreign affiliates and in labor intensive sectors. We show
that these anomalies are driven by the existence of processing exporters who are the
least productive among all types of firms. Removing processing exporters restores the
traditional finding since ordinary exporters are more productive than non-exporters.
Our results imply that it is essential to consider processing trade separately from
ordinary exporting activity when analyzing exporter performance in countries that
have large processing trade sectors.
We explain different mechanisms consistent with our result, and find the hy-
pothesis that processing/assembly is a different activity compared to ordinary trade
is the one that receives the most support from the data. Our data indicates that pro-
cessing involves unskilled labor intensive jobs that yield low profits and produces low
quality products. Moreover, since processing requires lower fixed costs (due to govern-
ment policy), only the low productive firms select into this activity. Transfer pricing
can also explain the unexceptional performance of foreign-owned processing trade
firms  especially since the low productivity of processing firms is very pronounced
for FIE but not for non-FIE. The data provides mixed evidence about transfer pricing
driving the low measured productivity of foreign owned processing firms.
Our findings have important policy implications. First, the re-allocation pre-
dictions in the presence of processing exporters are just opposite to that in the Melitz
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(2003) model, in which a move towards exporting increases average productivity of
the sector since exporters are more productive than non-exporters. A processing trade
driven export surge, contrary to this belief, would reduce the average productivity
since processing firms are the less productive ones. It thus becomes imperative to
look into the costs and benefits of export processing. Exporting is often encouraged
by countries on the ground that exporters are more productive and grow faster, so
that they can act as an engine of growth. Given our findings, it also makes sense to
evaluate learning from processing trade. This will have important policy implications
for countries conducting processing trade or planning to do so. We plan to study this
in the future.
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Table 1.1: Comparing merged and unmerged exporters in the firm level data
Merged exporters Unmerged exporters
Log Employment 5.37 5.27
(1.13) (1.17)
Log Sales 10.6 10.33
(1.30) (1.31)
Value Added per Worker 87.32 71.58
(203.10) (147.69)
TFP (Olley Pakes) 4.22 4.12
(1.15) (1.12)
N 52955 137357
Note: The above table reports mean of the variables with standard deviation in the parentheses for
merged and unmerged exporters.
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Table 1.2: Share of number of firms and export value by processing status (year
average)




Note: Authors' calculation using the merged data
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Table 1.3: Processing intensity distribution of exporters doing both processing and
non-processing trade
All Firms FIE Non-FIE
Mean 0.60 0.64 0.42
sd (0.36) (0.35) (0.34)
10th Percentile 0.06 0.08 0.02
25th Percentile 0.25 0.33 0.09
50th Percentile 0.68 0.77 0.34
75th Percentile 0.96 0.97 0.73
90th Percentile 0.99 0.99 0.99
Note: Authors' calculation using the merged data
24
Table 1.4: Productivity comparison by processing status
Dependant variables









Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade, omitted group are non-
exporters. All regressions include 4 digit industry, province and year fixed effects as additional
control. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05,
††p<0.1.
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Table 1.5: Productivity of exporters by ownership
Dependant variable is TFP (Olley-Pakes)









Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade, omitted group are non-
exporters, by subsamples based on ownership (FIE stands for Foreign Invested Enterprise). All
regressions include 4 digit industry, province and year fixed effects as additional control. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
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Figure 1.1: Share of processing exports across capital intensity of sectors
Note: Authors' calculation using the merged firm-level and customs data.
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Figure 1.2: TFP vs. processing intensity
Note: Productivity is TFP (Olley-Pakes) after removing industry-province-year fixed effects.
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Table 1.6: Productivity comparison by processing status and capital intensity of the
sector
(a) Dependent variable is value added per worker
Labor intensive Medium intensity Capital intensive
non-processing -0.104* -0.035* 0.048†
(0.013) (0.014) (0.023)
processing -0.503* -0.478* -0.163†
(0.026) (0.030) (0.076)
both -0.187* -0.064* 0.122*
(0.017) (0.020) (0.040)
Observations 110939 189699 127209
R-squared 0.141 0.134 0.155
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade, omitted group are non-
exporters, by capital intensity of the sector. All regressions include 4 digit industry, province and
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, †
p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
(b) Dependent variable is TFP (Olley-Pakes)
Labor intensive Medium intensity Capital intensive
non-processing 0.10* 0.155* 0.241*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022)
processing -0.206* -0.099* 0.121††
(0.023) (0.026) (0.066)
both 0.083* 0.197* 0.351*
(0.016) (0.018) (0.035)
Observations 116119 197065 132834
R-squared 0.256 0.372 0.294
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade, omitted group are non-
exporters, by capital intensity of the sector. All regressions include 4 digit industry, province and
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, †
p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
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Table 1.7: Productivity comparison by processing status and sectoral capital intensity
(FIE only)
Dependant variable is TFP (Olley Pakes)
Labor intensive Medium intensity Capital intensive
non-processing 0.062* 0.066* 0.192*
(0.020) (0.022) (0.037)
processing -0.139* -0.076* 0.088
(0.026) (0.028) (0.072)
both 0.059* 0.124* 0.270*
(0.019) (0.021) (0.042)
Observations 26559 31305 16899
R-squared 0.293 0.359 0.297
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade, omitted group are non-
exporters, by capital intensity of the sector. Only foreign owned firms are included. All regressions
include 4 digit industry, province and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
30
Table 1.8: Productivity of exporters depending on export intensity and processing
status
Dependant variable is TFP (Olley-Pakes)
All Firms Foreign Owned non-Foreign Owned
Reg Ex+Non-Processing 0.191* 0.080* 0.191*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.012)
Reg Ex+Processing 0.054* -0.015 0.078
(0.021) (0.023) (0.068)
Reg Ex+Both 0.278* 0.142* 0.380*
(0.012) (0.015) (0.025)
Pure Ex+ Non-processing 0.162* 0.096* 0.134*
(0.020) (0.030) (0.027)
Pure Ex+Processing -0.262* -0.297* -0.189
(0.024) (0.026) (0.150)
Pure Ex+Both 0.020 -0.067* 0.161†
(0.024) (0.026) (0.074)
N 441765 71592 370173
R-squared 0.338 0.333 0.343
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade for regular and pure ex-
porters separately, omitted group are non-exporters. All regressions include 4 digit industry, province
and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, †
p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
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Table 1.9: Productivity of exporters depending on export intensity, processing status
and capital intensity of sector
Dependant variable is TFP (Olley-Pakes)
Labor intensive Medium intensity Capital intensive
Reg Ex+Non-Processing 0.098* 0.157* 0.256*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.023)
Reg Ex+Processing -0.157* -0.016 0.245*
(0.029) (0.031) (0.075)
Reg Ex+Both 0.109* 0.234* 0.395*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.037)
Pure Ex+ Non-processing 0.109* 0.155* 0.034
(0.025) (0.036) (0.090)
Pure Ex+Processing -0.357* -0.351* -0.287*
(0.032) (0.040) (0.100)
Pure Ex+Both -0.049†† -0.119* -0.054
(0.029) (0.048) (0.094)
N 113577 195762 132426
R-squared 0.255 0.372 0.295
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade for regular and pure ex-
porters separately, omitted group are non-exporters. The regressions are run separately for different
capital intensity levels of the sectors. All regressions include 4 digit industry, province and year
fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05,
††p<0.1.
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Table 1.10: Robustness checks
Dependant variable is TFP (Olley-Pakes)
Size and Indst-province- Year Weighted Drop
ownership year FE 2005 regressions outliers
non-processing 0.124* 0.125* 0.108* 0.075* 0.117*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.028) (0.008)
processing -0.168* -0.164* -0.256* -0.058 -0.175*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.051) (0.015)
both 0.124* 0.125* 0.103* 0.121* 0.116*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.032) (0.011)
Observations 446018 446018 131118 426823 437098
R-squared 0.343 0.422 0.346 0.490 0.343
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade, omitted group are non-
exporters. Regressions in column 1, 4 and 5 include 4 digit industry, province and year fixed effects.
Column 2 uses industry-province-year fixed effects. Column 3 runs regressions only for year 2005.
Column 4 uses industry value added share as weights. Column 5 drops the top and bottom 1%
of observations. All regressions include size and ownership (SOE and FIE) as additional controls.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
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Table 1.11: Processing trade is a different activity
Dependant variable is TFP (Olley-Pakes)
Profit per Wage per Capital Input over Export
worker worker intensity sales price
non-processing 0.025 0.094* 0.024† 0.010*
(0.018) (0.005) (0.012) (0.002)
processing -0.486* -0.030* 0.023 -0.038* -0.140*
(0.034) (0.010) (0.021) (0.006) (0.041)
both 0.086* 0.144* 0.221* -0.007† 0.321*
(0.024) (0.007) (0.015) (0.003) (0.028)
Observations 341204 427599 428189 447963 52883
R-squared 0.144 0.263 0.187 0.033 0.412
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on non-processing, processing,
and both dummies, omitted group is non-exporter (except the last column where the omitted group
is non-processing exporters). All regressions include industry, province and year fixed effects, size
and ownership of firm (SOE or FIE) as additional controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
Table 1.12: Evidence of transfer pricing using profits per worker
Dependant variable is TFP (Olley Pakes)
High Med Low High Med Low
FIE non-FIE
non-processing 0.061 0.017 -0.077 0.065†† 0.128* 0.012
(0.044) (0.046) (0.054) (0.036) (0.036) (0.043)
processing -0.246* -0.264* -0.393* -0.278 0.325 0.423
(0.052) (0.073) (0.075) (0.180) (0.230) (0.290)
both 0.043 0.245* 0.082 0.293* 0.469* 0.284*
(0.040) (0.048) (0.052) (0.070) (0.083) (0.092)
Observations 22481 19408 12365 109412 113104 63452
R-squared 0.239 0.139 0.257 0.145 0.111 0.130
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on dummies of non-processing
exporters, processing exporters and exporters doing both types of trade, omitted group are non-
exporters, by capital intensity of the sector. Only foreign owned firms are included. All regressions
include 4 digit industry, province and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
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Table 1.13: Productivity comparison after controlling for market power
Dependant variable is TFP (Olley Pakes)
Control for Control for Control for
export markup market size




both 0.185* 0.132* -0.023*
(0.017) (0.011) (0.008)
N 43511 445280 445463
R-squared 0.475 0.373 0.578
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on non-processing exporter,
processing exporter, and exporter doing both, omitted group is non-exporter (except first column
where processing firm is the omitted group). All regressions include industry, province and year
fixed effects, size and ownership of firm (SOE and FIE) as additional controls. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
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Chapter 2
Imports, Offshoring and Wages: Rent
Sharing or Composition?1
2.1 Introduction
One of the pertinent questions regarding globalization is: how does globaliza-
tion affect wages? In this paper we address a particular aspect of that question: how
does offshoring2 affect firm level average wage? Offshoring firms are found to pay
higher average wages than purely domestic firms (Bernard et al. 2007). Guided by
existing theory, we provide empirical analyses of different possible channels through
which offshoring can cause firm average wage differentials. Offshoring may push up
firm level average wage in different ways: first, if firms offshore low-skilled low-wage
tasks that automatically increases the average wage of the remaining jobs. We call
this the skill composition effect. Second, offshoring can be viewed as new technology
that firms adopt to reduce costs and increase revenue and profits. In a labor market
1This chapter is written jointly with Henrik Bursland Fosse from Copenhagen Busi-
ness School.
2Offshoring here refers to a fragmentation of the production process due to relocation of jobs from
the home country to the foreign country. Following Grossman and Helpman (2002) this includes
intra-firm trade by MNE (vertical FDI) and arms length trade by MNE and non MNE firms.
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environment featuring search, screening and bargaining frictions, offshoring firms and
their workers bargain over firm specific rents  offshoring induced rents can increase
wages of all existing workers and thus increase average wages in these offshoring firms.
We call this the rent sharing effect.
We explain how much each effect contributes towards higher average wages in
offshoring firms. Papers in the offshoring literature look at one channel at a time but
not both. It is possible that both effects exist in the data and looking at one channel
by ignoring the other may confound the results. In the past few years offshoring
has become a major trading activity. The impact of offshoring on parent country
labor outcomes stirs public controversy. We carefully investigate Danish worker-
firm data to disentangle the effects of the two suggested mechanisms on firm average
wages. It is important to distinguish the two effects from one another as policy makers
would draw diametrically opposite conclusions from either effect. While we document
the presence of the skill composition effect, underlining that certain jobs in Danish
firms do move out of the country, we also document that Danish firms benefit from
increased profitability and share this increased profitability with workers, i.e. through
rent sharing. Thus the presence of the one channel, skill composition, highlights what
developed nations worry about, but there is also the rent sharing channel that tells
a positive story about offshoring, and for some firms we find that the latter channel
completely accounts for the differential wage gains from offshoring.
Identifying the causal relationship between offshoring and higher firm level
average wage is difficult. First, firms endogenously select into offshoring: firms that
offshore are, on average, larger, more productive, and tend to pay higher wages than
smaller firms that are less productive and less likely to offshore. Second, higher skilled
workers may select into offshoring firms because these firms are bigger and pay higher
wages. Thus, separating the causal story from the selection story is important, i.e. to
say whether the higher average wage paid in offshoring firms stems from offshoring per
se or from higher productivity that simultaneously leads to more offshoring, higher
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output, and wages.
We use Danish worker-firm data that tracks the universe of Danish workers
across the universe of Danish firms. This amazingly rich dataset provides detailed
information on individuals' wage histories from which we are able to construct mea-
sures of skill composition effect and rent sharing effect at the firm level. Following
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (henceforth AKM), and Frias, Kaplan, and
Verhoogen (2009), we decompose the firm level average wage in each year into an
average person component, reflecting the skill composition of the workforce, and a
firm component which we interpret as the measure of time-varying firm specific rent
sharing.
We use events in China to identify the causal effect of a change in the incen-
tive to offshoring on firm level average wages. We argue that two possibly related
events occurred: First, China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in December 2001 created a surge in foreign firms operating in China as well as
new Chinese exporters. Upon accession, China made enormous changes to meet its
WTO obligations including among other things restructuring industries, publishing
previously internal laws and regulations, establishing formal procedures to adjudi-
cate disputes, leveling the playing field for foreign firms, and giving all firms right
to trade. These changes were phased in gradually over a transition period, usually
within three years after accession, directly influencing firms' incentive to offshore to
China. Second, there was a boom in Chinese world exports around 2003 driven by
the structural changes undertaken by the Chinese government around that time. This
led Chinese exports to more than double from 400 billion US dollars in 2002 to 900
billion in 2005. The surge in Chinese exports acted as an additional indirect incentive
for firms in Denmark to source from China in order to maintain competitiveness with
firms who would have cost advantage by sourcing cheaper Chinese resources. Thus,
China's joining the WTO can be viewed as a shock to the trading environment in
China and the observed Chinese export boom as a cost/technology shock, to which
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we expect Danish firms to respond. In fact, we do see a jump in the Danish share of
imports from China in 2003, indicating that Danish firms were affected by the shock.
The first step of our analyses is to ensure that within industries, firms offshoring
to China were affected differently compared to firms who were not offshoring to China3
in the 2002-2005 period. Next we check that the differential change was greater
during the shock period, 2002 -2005, compared to an earlier period, 1999 -2001. This
procedure ensures that we are identifying trend differentials between two completely
different periods and thus not trend differentials, a priori, between two types of firms
 the treatment and the control group.
We find that, between 2002-2005 average wage increased around 1.5 percent
more in firms offshoring to China compared to the control group. The skill com-
position effect accounted for a quarter of the differential increase while the rest was
explained by rent sharing. Our results are robust to controlling for underlying trend
differences i.e. comparing the wage gain in 2002-2005 with an earlier period, 1999-
2001. We get heterogeneous results once we split firms up by their offshoring status
in China: the differential wage increase between the two periods was the largest for
the new offshorers i.e. firms offshoring to China in 20024 but not in 19995 and was
explained by rent sharing only. The continuing offshorers i.e. firms that offshored
to China in both 1999 and 2002 experienced differential wage increase between the
two periods mostly through the skill composition effect. Firms offshoring to China
in 1999 but not in 2002 showed no differential wage change in this period. These
heterogeneous patterns are not discernible when we use common proxies for measures
of skill composition and rent sharing6 available in the typical firm level datasets.
The difference in results when using measures of composition and rent sharing effects
3In particular the control group used in the results presented in this paper includes firms offshoring
to other low middle-income countries but not China in 2002 and non-offshoring firms.
42002 is the beginning of the defined shock period.
51999 is the beginning of the defined pre-shock period.
6Such as ratio of educated to uneducated workers and sales per employee.
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from the firm level data to those constructed from the worker-firm data shows that we
should draw results from the typical firm level data (commonly used in the offshoring
literature) with more caution.
In addition to papers that use linked worker-firm and firm level data our work
is related to a number of papers using industry level data. Feenstra and Hanson (1996,
1997) show that offshoring affects firm level average wage by affecting the skill compo-
sition of the domestic workforce. Becker, Ekholm and Muendler (2009) find evidence
that offshoring is associated with a shift towards more non-routine and interactive
tasks as well as a shift towards more educated workers (skill composition effect) in
German MNEs. In these models the labor market is assumed to be perfectly compet-
itive and cannot account for possible rent sharing effects. Allowing for imperftectly
competitive labor market, Bagger, Christensen and Mortensen (2010) find evidence
of rent sharing in the Danish labor market, but their paper does not address the
offshoring issue. Sethupathy's (2008) bargaining model assumes homogeneous labor
and shows that offshoring increases productivity and profitability of offshoring firms
compared to non-offshoring firms. The differential increases lead to higher domestic
wages at offshoring firms through a positive rent sharing mechanism. Using US MNE
firm level data he provides evidence that higher average wages at offshoring firms is
consistent with a rent sharing mechanism. However, his outcome is also consistent
with the skill composition effect and his results do indicate that the skill composition
effect is present. Kramarz (2008) also uses a bargaining model to show that offshoring
can affect wages directly by altering firms' threat point and thus changing the overall
quasi-rent shared between firms and workers. His model shows that level of union
strength matters, with firms facing stronger unions offshore more, decreasing the size
of the quasi-rent to discipline workers. Using French worker-firm data he shows that
firms facing stronger unions increased offshoring more with an associated decline in
employment and rents. His results indicate that offshoring might have a dampening
effect on wages through the rent sharing mechanism. His paper also assumes ho-
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mogeneous labor and is silent about the skill composition channel. Hummels et al.
(2010) analyze relationship between offshoring and workers' wages and employment
opportunities also using Danish employer-employee data. They find that exogenous
import shocks increases wages of skilled labors and decrease wages of unskilled work-
ers, whereas shocks to exporting increases wages of both types of workers. They also
look at the relationship between displaced workers and offshoring and find that work-
ers displaced by offshoring experience more persistent wage losses compared to those
displaced for other reasons, and the effect is more pronounced for low-skilled workers.
Our results complement their findings on wages and shocks to offshoring; we show
that offshoring affects average wages through both skill composition and rent sharing
effects. A paper close to ours in terms of econometric methodology is Frias, Kaplan,
Verhoogen (2009) (henceforth FKV), we use their method for constructing measures
of firm level skill composition and rent sharing effect from worker's wage level data.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical mo-
tivation behind our work. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 discusses the
econometric methodology and identification strategy. In section 5.1 we use firm level
measures similar to what has been used in the offshoring literature in the absence of
worker-firm data. In section 5.2 we make full use of the worker-firm data to decom-
pose firm level average wage into a skill component and a rent sharing component
and analyze how a shock in the incentive to offshoring affects average wages through
these channels. Section 6 does robustness checks and section 7 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Motivation
In this section we briefly sketch the theoretical motivation behind our work.
Suppose there are heterogeneous firms who differ in terms of productivity; hetero-
geneous workers who vary at the skill level; imperfections in the labor market with
presence of search costs, screening and wage bargaining leading to rent sharing be-
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tween firms and workers. As a result, wage of each worker type depends on the share
of firm-specific rents. We do not assume any particular form of rent sharing i.e.
the form can be profit sharing, revenue sharing or both7. Both high-skilled and low
skilled tasks are required for production of a good. Either type of task can be off-
shored which involves a marginal cost and a common fixed cost. Heterogeneous firms
and fixed cost of offshoring imply that only the most productive firms can endoge-
nously select into offshoring. The less productive firms must source from the home
market.
A new offshoring opportunity can be viewed as new technology involving a
fixed cost and a lower marginal cost compared to sourcing from the home market.
Following a fall in the cost of offshoring, more firms will be able to take advantage
of this technology but some firms will still not be productive enough to overcome the
fixed cost. The new offshoring opportunity will imply displacement of jobs in firms
that offshore. Thus, a fall in the cost of offshoring changes the skill composition in the
offshoring firms compared to the non-offshoring firms. If relatively low skilled, low
wage jobs are sent abroad then onshore skill composition increases. Because skilled
labor earns higher wage, offshoring increases the average onshore wage through a pure
composition effect. This effect was first suggested in Feenstra and Hanson (1996). We
call this the skill composition effect on firm level average wage8.
We expect that firms become more cost efficient by taking advantage of new
offshoring opportunities. This effect leads to a reallocation of production and profits
towards the offshoring firms. If rent sharing exists between firms and workers then the
wage of the average worker increases in offshoring firms and falls in the disadvantaged,
non-offshoring firms. We call the second effect the rent sharing effect. Thus both the
7Some commonly used, empirical proxies of firm specific rents are: sales per employee (revenue)
or profits per employee (profit sharing).
8This effect can work in either ways: if high-skill jobs are offshored the onshore skill composition
falls causing the average onshore wage to fall. Recent empirical evidence suggests that offshorability
does not solely depend on the skill level of the task but rather on the degree of routineness and
interactiveness of the task. So offshoring can indeed decrease the onshore skill composition.
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skill composition and the rent sharing effects could be responsible for higher domestic
wages at offshoring firms compared to non-offshoring firms. Our empirical approach
in sections 4.2 and 5.2 investigates how much each channel contributes towards higher
average wage in offshoring firms. While the skill composition effect provides evidence
for the type of jobs offshored within firms, the rent sharing effect is evidence for the
firms' profitability and their survival in the market. It is important to distinguish
between the two effects, since these two effects will have different policy implications.
For a simple illustration of the two effects at work, let us consider the very
simple case of two types of labor: low skilled (L) and high-skilled (H) labor. Onshore





where sf is the onshore share of labor of type-f and wf is onshore wage of worker of
type-f worker, f={L,H}. We can decompose the discrete change in firm level average








The first term on the right hand side is the change in firm level average wage due
to a change in skill composition and the second term is the change in average wage
brought about through a change in the wage of each type of worker, e.g. due to a
rent sharing mechanism.
Many settings can lead to simultaneous increase of revenues and profits with
wages. We suggest a causal explanation by using a shock in the incentive to offshore
and splitting up the effect on firm average wages into two channels: (1) skill composi-
tion change that affects firm average wage and (2) changes in profits that are shared
through rent bargaining leading to all wages increasing at the firm and thus also firm
average wages.
Other possible explanations include that more productive firms induce higher
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learning and thus higher wages. Offshoring firms may transfer knowledge across the
border and increase worker productivity locally, making their workers  otherwise
identical to workers in lower productivity firms  more valuable and thus pay them
higher wages (Malchow-Møller, Markusen and Schjerning, 2007). We believe that
this possible explanation is not a likely concern in our setting: it is not obvious that
sourcing from China generates these types of spillover gains for workers, and certainly
not in the first years following the broad opening up of China.
One might also think of compensating differentials: to take a job or stay in a
job in a sector or a firm where workers due to offshoring  face the risk of being
separated from their jobs or reallocated to less attractive job positions, the firm
may have to offer workers a compensating differential. We consider this reasoning
amounting essentially to a type of rent sharing: the management team at the firm
still needs stable onshore labor, and workers use their bargaining power when they
see profitability at the firm increases.
What we track in our estimates are changes to the level of firm fixed effects on
firm average wages during a period. We do not track the composition of the level of
worker-firm time-varying fixed effects. Thus, we stick to the concept of rent sharing
when talking about estimated changes to time varying firm fixed effects. Note that
the conclusions one draws form the two channels are diametrically opposite. The skill
composition channel suggests what kind of jobs Danish firms offshore to China. This
channel thus underlines an imminent concern for policy makers  how to compensate
the workforce separated from their jobs as a result of offshoring. The rent sharing
effect however underlines that there are positive sides to offshoring because it increases
profitability of the firm and the firm shares part of the profits with its workers, thus
contributing to improved welfare.
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2.3 Data
Our main data source for this paper is the very rich, Danish, annual, matched,
worker-firm panel from Statistics Denmark. The data currently spans from 1996-2008
and includes data from three linked databases, FIDA (1996-2008), IDA (1980-2008),
and firm level External Trade Statistics (1990-2008). For our baseline results we use
data on manufacturing firms only spanning from 1999-2005. All data are restricted
and provided by Statistics Denmark.
FIDA is the Firm Integrated Database for Labor Market Research. It contains
the (almost) full population of firms registered in Denmark. It provides accurate firm
level data, including general, external accounting statistics, number of employees,
and a record of individuals employed in the firms. Via a person key, FIDA can
be linked to the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA), containing
extensive information on socio-economic characteristics of the population of Danish
residents. IDA variables include among others hourly wage, status on connection to
labor market, age, sex, education, experience, tenure, and occupation. Education can
broadly be classified in three categories: high-skilled, requiring tertiary education;
medium skilled, requiring vocational education defined as consumption of secondary
education; and low skilled, defined as persons with short cycle education (typically
1-2 years) or high school education.
Via a firm key, we also link the worker-firm panel to firm level External Trade
Statistics (1990-2008). This adds country-product level9 bilateral external trade data
to our dataset. Each trade flow contains information on the value of trade in DKK
(f.o.b prices for exports and c.i.f prices for imports), the weight, and the volume. This
dataset allows us to investigate the effect of a change in the incentive to offshore on
firm level average wage.
9Product classification is the European Combined Nomenclature (CN), 8-digits. We use at the
maximum 6-digit level which is consistent with HS-6 classification.
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Our main results are based on core manufacturing firms (NACE 15-36)10. We
consider firms with 10 or more employees. We also carry out robustness checks where
we use our entire sample of firms. Our measure of offshoring is a broad one that
includes firms' imports of both intermediate and consumption goods. For example a
positive productivity or cost shock in China might affect offshoring decision of Dan-
ish firms, hence their imports and wages. In line with our theoretical motivation,
firms that are able to import consumption and intermediate goods are able to ex-
pand their available potential technologies with associated increase in profitability
that get translated into higher firm level average wage through rent sharing. Imports
by manufacturing firms will also affect the kind of tasks (low skill and high skill)
performed in the domestic firm and thus affect firm level skill composition. In our
empirical analysis, imports as a share of sales proxy for offshoring at the firm level,
and we proxy offshoring firms as those sourcing from abroad. Skill composition and
rent sharing measures are constructed from the data using a worker level wage regres-
sion equation and explained in detail in the estimation strategy section. Table 2.1
provides comparison of firm level characteristics for the year 2005. Consistent with
firm level findings in other countries, Danish firms that offshore are bigger in terms of
employment and sales; have higher skill ratio (in terms of educated and non-educated
workers), profits per employee and hourly wage, both on average and for each type
of employee. For example offshoring firms have on average 85% higher employment
and 36% higher sales than non offshoring firms. This result holds for other years in
the sample as well11. However, these results do not provide a causal mechanism from
offshoring to higher wages, which we discuss in the following section.
10Manufacturing firms best suit the underlying theoretical motivation and has often been used in
empirical papers in the offshoring literature.
11The column to the far right of Table 2.1 presents results from simple mean difference regressions
(i.e. statistical differences between means for offshoring firms and means for non-offshoring firms).
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2.4 Estimation
We are interested in assessing how a change in the incentive to offshore affects
firm level average wage through the skill composition effect and the rent sharing effect.
In the first step we show how firm level average wage can be split into a rent sharing
component and a skill component. Our estimation strategy of decomposing firm level
average wage essentially relies on the FKV technique. In the second step we relate
the change in average wage and the two components arising from an exogenous shock
in the incentive to offshore to China. We begin by discussing our second step: the
identification strategy. Then we move on to our estimation method.
2.4.1 Identification Strategy
In this section we argue why we choose 2002-2005 as the shock period for our
difference-in-differences estimations. 1999-2001 will act as our pre-shock period. In
the following discussion we thus refer to the years 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2005 as
they mark the beginning and the end of the two periods considered. We base our
segregation of firms into control and treatment groups based on the firms' status in
the first year of the two periods considered (i.e. 1999 or 2002).
To test how a change in offshoring opportunity affects firm level average wage
through composition and rent sharing effects, we use events in China as exogenous
shocks in the incentive to offshore to China. The events represent business condition,
cost and productivity shocks in China and are likely to affect many local decisions of
Danish firms. Our analysis does not compare the clean case of increasing wage dif-
ferentials between firms offshoring and firms not offshoring. Instead, the estimations
are carried out as increasing wage differentials between firms taking advantage of a
new favorable offshoring destination and firms that do not.
China joined the WTO in December 2001, which was a very important event for
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the Chinese economy. An export boom12 occurred in China soon after China joined
the WTO, driven by the different policies undertaken by the Chinese government.
These two events mark China's coming to the forefront as an important member in the
global economy. China's accession to the WTO implied comprehensive liberalization,
some of which would come into effect immediately whereas others were to be phased
in over a period of typically less than three years. Some of the key components of
China's accession to the WTO involved:
(i) Gradual tariff reduction of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities.
However the scope of tariff reduction was not massive, only 40% of about 10,000
products at HS8 level were eligible for tariff reductions over a period of five years
with tariffs for the majority of the products being reduced by 2005.
(ii) Services commitments involving substantial market opening of a broad
range of service sectors, including banking, insurance, telecommunications, and pro-
fessional services.
(iii) Phasing out of NTM such as licenses, quota, tendering state trading,
export subsidy and removal of all WTO inconsistent non-tariff measures (NTMs) by
2005 as well as elimination of China's trade related investment measures (TRIMS).
(iv) Allowing all firms (whether domestic or foreign) the right to directly import
from and export within three years from accession  also providing the right to engage
in distribution of all products in China within three years of accession (except certain
extended restrictions on chemical fertilizers, crude oil, and refined petroleum).
(v) The provisions of systemic reforms involved broad reforms in the areas of
transparency, notice and comment, uniform application of laws, and judicial review
to help address barriers to foreign companies doing business in China.
(vi) China agreed to elimination of state-trading import monopolies for agri-
cultural and industrial products and to the requirement that state-owned enterprises
must make purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations.
12See Figure 2.1.
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Accession to the WTO signaled credibility to the world that China was open
for more foreign investment and trade. Given the enormous changes that were to
take place to facilitate both foreign investment in China and imports from China
to the rest of the world, China's accession to the WTO appears to be a shock of
considerable magnitude to the incentive to offshore to China since it created a more
conducive trading and business environment. This is the direct impact of China's
joining the WTO on the offshoring incentive of Danish firms.
The WTO membership for China helped in spearheading further economic
reforms, opened up the Chinese market for more international trade and higher levels
of foreign investment, and opened up the world economy for Chinese exports. This,
along with the various structural changes and liberalization policies adopted by the
Chinese government around that time, led to a surge in China's exports soon after
it joined WTO. Figure 2.1 shows that growth of exports from China to the rest of
the world (excluding Denmark) picked up in 2003 and 2004. China's emergence as
a major exporter had an indirect impact on firms' incentive to offshore from China
from a third party competition angle. If a firm does not source inputs from China,
but its rival firms (either in the same or a different country) do so and reduce their
costs and prices, then the firm has to follow suit or risk losing market share. Thus, as
the rest of the world begins sourcing cheap inputs from China, we should expect firms
in Denmark to behave similarly. One observation of interest is that though China
joined the WTO in December 2001, we see exports increased the most from China to
the rest of the world in 2003 and 2004. Two explanations are, first, that China had a
transition phase to complete the liberalization, so the initial changes were not large
enough to drive a large increase in exports immediately. Second, a small recession in
the world economy in the post 9/11 crisis dampened the export growth from China
in 2002. What is important in our context is that both these shocks, possibly related,
and global in nature, are exogenous to a small open economy like Denmark and would
not be affected by local firm behavior but would influence them.
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From Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 we see that Danish firms, both manufacturing
and non-manufacturing, reacted strongly to these episodes in China. Figure 2.2 shows
the growth charts of Danish manufacturing imports from top non-EU15 partners and
Eastern Europe. Imports from China (CN) by Danish manufacturing firms take off
in 2003 while this is not true for imports from Eastern European countries. These
import responses are consistent with the surge in Chinese world exports.
Figure 2.3 shows the number of firms (manufacturing and non-manufacturing)
importing from China as share of total firms, from 1999 to 2005. This pattern also
holds for the number of firms importing from China, for example in 2002 both the
total number of firms and manufacturing firms sourcing from China increased sharply,
by 37% and 30%, respectively, by far the biggest increase during 1999-2005. From
2001 to 2005 the number of firms importing from China increased over two times from
about 3000 to 7000, the corresponding numbers for manufacturing shows an increase
by two times approximately from a little less than 500 firms in 2001 to about a 1000
in 2005 (tables not reported). The above discussion indicates that Danish firms, both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing, did respond to the shock of China's emergence
as a leading exporter following its accession to the WTO.
Since the number of firms sourcing from China has increased dramatically over
a few years, we want to know about the nature of the firms that were sourcing from
China before we see a surge in share of imports from China in 2003. We divide firms
into the following four types: i) firms offshoring to China both in 2002 and 1999, ii)
firms offshoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999, iii) firms offshoring to China in
1999 but not in 2002, and iv) firms offshoring to low middle-income countries but not
China in 2002 and 1999 and non-offshoring firms, for the year 2002. In Table 2.2,
a comparison of firm characteristics based on the types listed above, show that the
firms who were sourcing from China in 2002 but not in 1999 (new offshoring firms)
are relatively smaller in terms of sales and employment compared to firms who were
sourcing from China in both 1999 and 2002 (existing offshoring firms), as well as firms
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who were offshoring to China only in 1999 but not in 2002 (former offshoring firms).
The omitted group consists of firms offshoring to low middle-income countries but
not China and non offshoring firms in 2002 and 1999.
Unlike other papers in this literature, we do not restrict offshoring to be only
intermediate goods imports for manufacturing firms; consumption goods imports are
also considered as offshoring in this paper. In Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 we list consump-
tion and intermediate commodities, respectively, based on the value imported in 2005
and 1999. Table 2.3a and Table 2.4a list top 10 commodities (based on their value
of imports in 2005 in DKK) that are classified as consumption goods and intermedi-
ate goods respectively. For example Table 2.3a shows that boys jackets and trousers
(HS6 products 620333 and 620343) are among the top products directly imported by
Danish manufacturing firms from China in 2005. We consider this as offshoring: if
the firms are making the garment designs in Denmark and producing the garments in
China and importing them back to Denmark, where they are labeled and packed then
it constitutes as offshoring in our context because fragmentation of the production
process occurs. Relocating production to China implies lower production costs, and
that is likely to induce skill composition and rent sharing effects. Moreover many of
the food products that are listed as consumption goods could very well be intermedi-
ate inputs in food manufacturing firms. Thus the fact that the surge in imports from
China to some extent is driven by consumption goods works well for the offshoring
framework we have in mind. Table 2.5a indicates that most of the increase in Chinese
imports between 2002 and 2005 was at the intensive margin; intensive margin being
defined as commodities imported from China in 2002 as well as 1999 at the HS6
product category level.
Finally, Table 2.5b provides the decomposition by two broad firm categories
those importing from China in 2002 and those not importing from China in 2002
but importing from China sometime between 2003 and 2005. We see that the former
category contributes more towards the total change in imports from China between
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2002-2005 period, mostly through the intensive margin; for the latter group, the entire
change is by definition at the extensive margin.
2.4.2 Firm Level Average Wage Decomposition
We use the basic statistical framework of AKM for decomposing information
on individual workers' wage into individual heterogeneity and firm heterogeneity. The
linear worker-firm regression model of AKM with time-varying firm effect is:
wit = αi + xitβ + ψj(i,t) + it (2.2)
where i, j, and t are individuals, firms and time respectively; wit is log wage; αi
is the time-invariant individual fixed effect. xit is a vector of observable time-varying
individual characteristics. So these components comprise the skill effect on individual
wages. ψj(i,t) is the time-varying firm effect. The function j(i, t) indicates the firm
in which worker i is employed in period t. We allow the firm effect ψj(i,t) to vary
over time to take into account changes in firm's wage policies in response to trade
shocks. it is the residual, with the identifying assumption that E[it|i, t, x] = 0 and
is orthogonal to all other effects in the model.
Following FKV, we now decompose the firm average wage into an average rent
sharing component and an average skill component. The way we do is by subtracting
from the variables their mean across individuals at each point in time. Note from
equation 2.2 that
αi = wit − xitβ − ψj(i,t) − it
Recalling that E(it) = 0, we then define the mean deviation of αi at time t as α˜i
α˜i ≡ αi − α¯i = αi − E(wit − xitβ − ψj(i,t) − it)
The sample analogue of the expression above uses the estimated parameters αˆi, βˆi,
and ψˆj(i,t) of equation 2.2:
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ˆ˜αi = wit − xitβˆ − ψˆj(i,t) − w¯t − xtβˆ − ψˆt
Define s˜it = sit−s¯t = α˜it+xitβ−xtβ as the mean deviated value of sit and introducing,
as above, the sample analogue we get:
ˆ˜sit = sˆit − ¯ˆst = ˆ˜αit + xitβ − xtβˆ
Inserting the expression for ˆ˜αi and manipulating we get the individual mean deviated
wage as:
wit − w¯t = ˆ˜sit + ψˆj(i,t) − ψˆt (2.3)
Taking the average across individuals within each firm j, we arrive at the split of
firm average wage into an average skill component and a rent sharing component,
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Denoting the mean deviated variables at the firm level in equation 2.4 as y˘jt =
y¯jt− y¯t, we now have the variables w˘jt, s˘jt and ψ˘jt. Analogous to the above equation
, we can write:
4w˘jt = 4s˘jt +4ψ˘jt
Using these three variables as our dependent variables in difference-in-differences es-
timations allows us to break down the coefficient on the treatment dummy in the
4w˘jt  regressions into the coefficients of the treatment dummies in the 4s˘jt and
4ψ˘jt  regressions, respectively. Thus, we track changes in firm average wages and
contribute the reason to either skill-compositional changes, rent-sharing effects from
increased profitability13, or both. Once again we underline that results from this split
leads to completely different policy conclusions: skill compositional changes underline
13One caveat with this rent sharing measure is that it is at the firm level. It might be possible that
the increased profitability from offshoring is shared with some workers (for example: high ranked
workers) and not all.
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that Danish firms do offshore low-skill jobs, but rent sharing effects increase wage for
workers at the Danish firms which adds a positive welfare story to offshoring that has
direct positive impact on workers at the firm.
2.4.3 Estimation Equations
We test our theoretical motivation given by equation 2.1 in section 2.2, us-
ing two types of difference-in-differences (D-i-D) estimations and a set of outcome
variables. Based on the identification strategy discussion earlier we define our shock
period to be 2002-2005 and a pre-shock period to be 1999-2001. Our D-i-D equations
are:
4ykj = α + βd_2002 +Dj + kj (2.5)
4ykj = α + β1d_1999_2002 + β2d_0_2002 + β3d_1999_0 +Dj + kj (2.6)
4ykj is the change in an outcome variable of interest for firm k in industry j
(Dj captures industry fixed effects). We consider the difference over 2002-2005. In
equation (6) d_2002 is a dummy variable for firms offshoring to China in 2002. Thus
d_2002 is our treatment firms; control firms (omitted group) are firms who offshore to
other low-middle income countries but not China as well as firms that do not source
inputs from abroad in 200214, 15.
Equation 2.6 carries out difference-in-differences estimates by firm types, de-
pending on when they were offshoring to China prior to 2003. As mentioned in the
data section, the types that we consider are: d_1999_2002, firms sourcing from China
in both 1999 and 2002; d_0_2002, firms offshoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999;
14To test for trend differences in a D-i-D-i-D.
15Results are similar using other treatment and control group. See the section on robustness.
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d_1999_0, firms offshoring to China in 1999 but not in 2002. The omitted group is
non-offshoring firms and firms not offshoring to China but other low middle income
countries. The main outcome variables of interest are 1) firm level average wage,
2) skill composition, and 3) rent sharing. All results in the next section use Danish
manufacturing firms only (NACE 15-36).
We carry out all estimations following two parallel tracks: One track utilizing
only typical firm level information, and a second track making full use of the worker-
firm matched data. Comparing these two approaches demonstrates the fruitfulness
of having worker-firm matched data even though the scope is firm level analyses.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Estimating Results from Firm Level Data
We begin by looking at firm level variables before decomposing firm level av-
erage wages into skill composition and rent sharing components from worker level
regression. Typically, firm level datasets give skill ratio (skilled vs. unskilled), sales
per employee (rent sharing). Apart from gauging the impact of the shock on various
firm level outcomes, this exercise allows us to compare our results obtained from using
more nuanced measures of skill composition and rent sharing effects by taking full
advantage of linked worker-firm information with those that are commonly used in
the literature and readily available in typical firm level datasets. The skill ratio that
we use in this section is the traditional measure based on education of the employee;
skilled labor being those having more than high school education and unskilled are
those with high school or less than high school level of education.
Table 2.6 shows the estimation of equation 2.5. From columns 1 and 2 we see
that average wage and skill ratio differentials changes are 1.5% and 3.6%, respectively,
higher for firms offshoring to China in 2002 compared to the control group. Columns
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3 indicate, interestingly, that there is no statistically significant change in sales per
employee. If sales per employee is taken as a proxy for revenue based rent sharing
then this result implies that skill composition is the only channel through which wages
are affected, due to offshoring, between treatment and control firms in this period.
Column 4 indicates that imports from China as share of sales (offshoring) are higher
for treatment firms than for control firms during the 2002-2005 time period, showing
that Danish firms offshoring to China in 2002 are better able to take advantage of the
liberalized business environment in China and hence the fall in the cost of offshoring
to China16, 17. However, though Chinese trade has become important for Denmark
over the years, it constitutes about 5% of manufacturing imports. One possible worry
is that the increased share of imports from China comes at the expense of reduced
imports from rest of the world. For example, the Danish firms that had already
offshored production abroad may now relocate these activities to China. Though this
is not increased offshoring (since the activity has been offshored already), there can
still be rent sharing effects from reduced costs and increased revenues and profits.
Back of the envelope calculations show that Denmark's average annual growth rate
of imports from China was 3.6% in 1999-2002 and increased to 55% in 2002-2005
period. For imports from rest of the world except China the respective growth rates
of imports in the two periods were 3% and 17%. Based on this evidence we can safely
conclude that the observed increase in imports from China is not accounted for by
reduced imports from rest of the world.
16This value of imports includes all imports. In the robustness test we have constructed a narrower
measure of imports by excluding primary inputs as a proxy for offshoring. Results are same using
the narrower measure. In this paper we show results using only the braod measure of offshoring
including imports of primary inputs.
17The control group includes non-offshoring firms, inflating the effect if they do not choose to
offshore during the period. On the other hand, some of them could choose to offshore in 2003,
2004 or 2005, which could imply arbitrarily large jumps in import shares (from zero to something)
compared to the treatment firms that mostly offshored to somewhere else than China at the beginning
of 2002. Thus, presence of non-offshoring firms in the control group could also understate the effect.
However, excluding these (few) non-importing manufacturers does not change results much. Thus,
for consistency we decide to stick to the same sample as for the other estimations in Table 2.6.
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Since the number of firms importing from China has increased over the years,
we carry out the difference-in-differences estimation over 2002-2005 by breaking down
types of firms depending on when they were offshoring to China and see if any dif-
ferential results emerge among the different types of firms. Table 2.7 shows our
findings; the types we are interested here are firms offshoring to China both in 2002
and 1999 (existing offshorers); firms offshoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999 (new
offshorers); firms offshoring to China in 1999 but not in 2002 (former offshorers);
firms offshoring to low middle-income countries but not China and non-importing
firms (the omitted group). The results in Table 2.7 show that the firms offshoring
to China in 2002 but not in 1999 experience the highest differential wage increases.
Firms present in China in both 1999 and 2002 also show increase in average domestic
wages in this period but less than the firms new to sourcing inputs from China. Just
as in Table 2.6, column 3 in Table 2.7 indicates no differential labor productivity
(sales-per-employee) changes between the different types of firms in the 2002-2005
period.
Since China's joining the WTO was anticipated, we may worry that our treat-
ment firms are responding to the shock by changing their technology before 2002
to take better advantage of cheaper Chinese resources and this might lead to higher
wages by increasing labor productivity. The findings in Table 2.7 alleviate that worry.
Though the accession was anticipated, there was quite a lot of uncertainty in Den-
mark about the suitability of offshoring to China, apart from the various restrictions
that were not to be dismantled till after China joined WTO. It is likely that this
uncertainty prevented firms from increasing the level of offshoring to China in an-
ticipation of the future changes. Hence, although firms could foresee new offshoring
opportunities due to the long drawn WTO negotiations, it is unlikely that they could
take advantage of it before the liberalizations actually came into effect. The results
in column (4) provides support to this idea; since the change in offshoring was higher
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for the two types of firms importing from China in 200218, compared to the omitted
group, we can conclude that both types of offshoring firms responded to the shocks
by increasing the share of imports from China in the 2002-2005 period. The results
in this table also indicate that the wage increases we witness in Table 2.6 are most
pronounced for the firms that decide to offshore to China around 2002. This finding
coupled with results in descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 lends support to the idea
that China's accession to the WTO and the soon after surge in Chinese exports was
more important for the relatively smaller and less productive firms who could not
take advantage of Chinese imports prior to 2002 because of restrictive business envi-
ronment in China; they began offshoring to China once China joined the WTO and
also saw a surge in exports soon after.
To ensure that the results observed in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 are indeed driven
by the shock and not by differential trends between the more productive treatment
firms compared to the less productive control firms, we need to check that the observed
change in the outcome variables was greater during the period 2002-2005 than in
other periods. We consider the pre-shock period to be 1999-2001. We estimate an
equation similar to equation 2.6, taking the difference in the change in the outcome
variable of interest over 2002-2005 from 1999-2001 and regressing it on the three
types of firm dummies. This essentially leads to a triple-differences strategy which
purges any differential trend for the firms. Results in Table 2.8 indicate that the
differential change in average wage is the largest for firms new to offshoring from China
in 2002. Average wage changed 3.6% more for these firms in the 2002-2005 period
than in the 1999-2001 period compared to control firms. Skill ratio changesthough
positiveare not significant. Differential change in sales per employee between the
two periods is not significant either for the new offshoring firms compared to the
omitted group. To sum up, though we find that events in China caused differential
outcomes in 2002-2005 between the treatment and the control firms over and above
18These are firms continuing offshoring from China, and firms new to offshoring from China.
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their basic underlying trend differences, using crude proxies for skill composition and
rent sharing cannot explain what is driving the observed differential wage increase.
Since skill includes much more than education and rent sharing might not just mean
sharing revenue, we now use information on workers' wage histories in our worker-
firm data to construct more rigorous measures of skill composition and rent sharing
effects.
2.5.2 Estimating the Effects from a Worker-Firm Regression
We first estimate a standard AKM-type model  equation 2.2  with time-
varying firm effects. The inclusion of time varying firm effects allows us to address
changes in firm wage policies following trade shocks. As time varying returns to indi-
viduals we include linear and quadratic terms for experience and age, and education
(high skill: tertiary education; medium skill: vocational education; omitted group:
high school or less). Table 2.9 shows the estimates from our worker-firm regression.
As expected, more years of experience are associated with higher wages and there
are diminishing returns to experience. Similar results are also true for age. Unsur-
prisingly, high-skilled workers and medium skilled workers earn more than lowor
unskilledworkers.
We then estimate the effect of the shock on firm level average wage through the
two effects constructed from the worker-firm regression using estimation equations
2.5 and 2.6. Table 2.10 presents results for difference-in-differences estimates for
equation 2.5 over the 2002-2005 period. In this section we now find that average wages
(deviated from annual mean) increased 1.2% more for firms offshoring to China in
2002 than control firms and both skill composition and rent sharing are responsible
for this increase  both significant at the 10% level. Skill composition increased
0.3% more for firms offshoring to China in 2002 and explains about 25% of the wage
increase. Rent sharing increased 0.9% more for firms offshoring to China in 2002 and
accounts for as much as 75% of the wage increase.
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To ensure that the difference we observe is indeed driven by the shock, we carry
out a triple differences estimation similar to Table 2.8, by regressing the changes in
our outcome variables of interest (firm level average wage, skill composition and rent
sharing deviated from their respective annual means) between 2002-2005 and 1999-
2001 periods, on the different firm dummies. The results for wages corroborate what
we found earlier. Table 2.11 shows significant (at 10%-level) differential wage gains
for firms new to offshoring from China (d_0_2002). Now we can say what is driving
that wage differential: rent sharing only. Interestingly, for firms offshoring to China
in both 1999 and 2002 (the existing offshoring firms), the differential gain in wages
between the two periods is explained more by skill composition effectrent sharing
though positive is insignificant. For firms offshoring to China only before 2002, all
the outcome variables have negative sign, though none are significant. The fact that
wages increased differentially for the firms offshoring to China in 2002 is in line with
the underlying theory. Moreover, we arrive at the apparent puzzle: the mechanisms
behind the differential wage increase between the two periods (2002-2005 and 1999-
2001) is different for the relatively smaller firms offshoring to China in 2002 but
not in 1999, and the relatively larger firms offshoring to China in both 2002 and
1999. A glance at our data in Table 2.2 shows that the firms offshoring to China
in 2002 and not in 1999 (d_0_2002) are smaller than firms offshoring to China in
both 1999 and 2002 (d_1999_2002). Thus, the former firms are likely to have more
homogeneous workers in terms of skill over the years and that could explain why
their differential change in skill composition between the two periods is small. Bigger
firms continuing to offshore to China are likely to have more diverse workforce hence
their wage increase is accounted for by both mechanisms. Again, comparing results
in Table 2.8 and Table 2.11 suggest that using measures of skill composition and
rent sharing using worker-firm matched data allows us to take into account aspects
of average wage determination that is not captured by traditional measures of skill
based on education, and rent sharing based on revenue sharing.
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2.6 Robustness Checks
In this section we carry out different robustness tests to strengthen our main
results19.
As a first check we re-estimate our main equation using alternate firm dummies,
to see whether there was any differential wage effect for firms who began offshoring
from China between 2003-2005, though their decision to do so was possibly endoge-
nous. The firm types that we consider are d_2002: firms offshoring to China in
2002; and d_2003_2005: firms offshoring to China after 2002, i.e. sometime in 2003-
2005 period but not doing so in 2002; the omitted group are firms not offshoring to
China between 2002-2005 but offshoring to other low-middle income countries and
non-offshoring firms. Table 2.12 provides qualitatively similar results for the firms
offshoring to China in 2002 (d_2002) as found in Table 2.6. Both skill composition
and rent sharing effects explain the higher change in wages and the latter channel
explains more of the increase for these firms. We also see that there are wage gains
for firms offshoring to China after 2002, mostly via the skill composition effect, so
firms that began offshoring to China later have also gained. Table 2.13 presents a
triple differences estimate by comparing the differential change in the change in our
outcome variables of interest over 1999-2001 period and 2002-2005 period. The re-
sults indicate that there are differential gains in wages between the two periods for
both types of firms, and both channels matter.
We carry out our main estimation using manufacturing firms only. We re-run
the main estimations with all firms: manufacturing, services and retail/wholesale
firms. The reason is twofold: first, our data reveals that firms switch status over the
years; so a manufacturing firm might become a service or retail firm by offshoring its
19We have looked at the impact of the shock on other firm level variables such as employment and
sales. We find that the differential increase in employment and sales was less at the treatment firms
compared to the control firms (tables not reported). These results confirms the hypothesis that the
shock from China did affect the treatment firms in different dimensions.
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manufacturing operations. These firms would drop from our manufacturing sample
and thus might lead to under-estimation of the effects of offshoring on our variables
of interest. Second, the impact of the shock was also very pronounced for non-
manufacturing firms as discussed in section 4.1. The results, displayed in Table
2.14, are consistent with our main results presented in Table 2.11, though coefficient
estimates are now larger. We see there was wage gain for firms offshoring to China in
2002, and relatively more of that increase is explained through rent sharing. Triple
differences estimation results in Table 2.15 again show that most of the differential
increase is for the firms importing from China in 2002 but not 1999, but now only
skill composition effects significantly explain that increase, and just roughly half of
the differential gain. The other half explained by rent sharing is not statistically
significant. There is also differential increase in wages observed for the firms importing
from China in 2002 and in 1999, and that increase is still explained only through the
skill composition effect and completely dominate the total effect on average wages.
What if the effects we see are not from the firms' new activities in China but
instead from offshoring to other, similar countries? That is a very relevant concern.
We have run our procedures on other similar countries and former Eastern European
countries among which many are now part of the EU20 and not low-income countries
anymore. We find no results. Recall that we have a well-sustained argument for
an unanticipated shock for Danish firms, particularly for small firmseven though
China's accession was anticipated. In fact, running our regressions on a subsample of
small firms10-50 employeesshow even stronger average effects. We see no other
shocks, (for example the addition of many East European countries to the EU in 2004)
of arguably the same scale. Table 2.16 shows that there is no differential impact for
firms offshoring to Czech Republic in 2002 compared to the omitted group21. The
20A lot of these East European countries such as Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia joined the EU in 2004.
21The different groups are created the same way as before, now the relevant country for offshoring
is Czech Republic instead of China. For example continuing offshorers in Table 2.16 are firms
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case of the Czech Republic demonstrates nicely why effects must come from China's
accession to the WTO acting as an unanticipated shock: very few of the treatment
firms also offshore to the Czech Republic. The reason is that many of the firms are
relatively new to offshoring and have few common source countries apart from China
(see Table 2.18).
In 2005, growth in imports from Eastern European countries starts to pick up
lowering the ratio of imports from China relative to Eastern European imports. To
exclude this possible source of gains from offshoring to countries other than China
from our results on the treated groups we run the estimations with the shock period
defined as 2002 to 2004 instead of 2002 to 2005. The baseline results hold and
estimates areperhaps contrary to one's a priori beliefsgenerally higher (see Table
2.19). Combined with the robustness check from other countries just discussed above
in this section, we are confident that our results stem from the opening up of China
as a sourcing destination and the dominating shock for our treatment groups. We
do still refer to the results based on 2002-2005 as our main results because growth in
imports from China still dominates any other sourcing destination in 2005 and thus
define by when imports from China in an absolute amount truly takes off.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper uses rich linked worker-firm data from Denmark to address how
offshoring affects firm level average wage. We use China's accession to the WTO in
December 2001 and the boom in Chinese exports soon after, as exogenous shocks to
the incentive to offshore to China by Danish firms. These shocks allow us to identify
the causal effect of offshoring on wages.
Unlike other papers in this literature, we consider different possible channels
 namely skill composition and rent sharing effects  to explain offshoring induced
offshoring to Czech Republic in 2002 and in 1999.
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gains in firm average wages. A skill composition effect increases average wage if firms
send low-skilled jobs abroad retaining high-skilled workers at home who require higher
pay. A rent sharing effect increases average wage if firms share offshoring induced
increase in profits with all existing worker. Our findings show that firms sourcing
from China in 2002 had higher increase in average wages between 2002 and 2005
compared to the control group22.
We find that both skill composition and rent sharing effects significantly matter
in explaining the wage gain. Moreover, it is important to separate out the effects of
the two channels since they have different policy implications. While the presence of
the skill composition effects does underline that Danish firms offshore certain jobs,
the presence of the rent sharing effect highlights that firms offshoring to China also
enjoy increased profitability and share that with employees. The important result to
highlight here is that the timing of when a firm is exposed to a shock to the incentive
to offshore matters. In our case: firms present in China before China's accession to
the WTO in December 2001 offshored jobs using relatively unskilled labor. Whereas,
firms not present in China before the time of accession increased profitability and
shared these increases with their employees, thus pointing to increased welfare. These
firms however did not offshore relatively more any particular skill type of job. One
possible explanation for this could be the size difference of the two types of firms and
hence their workforce composition. Smaller manufacturing firms (less than thirty
employees) are likely to have more homogeneous workforce and for them the average
skill level of the workers might not change much over the years. Bigger firms already
offshoring to China are likely to have more diverse workforce and hence for them
both composition and rent sharing matter for the wage increase. However, the skill
composition effect significantly explains about half that gain while the other half
explained by the rent sharing effect is not statistically significant.
22Control group consists of firms offshoring to low middle income countries but not China and
non-offshoring firms.
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Though we carry out estimations at the firm level, we fully utilize the worker-
firm match data. Following Frias, Kaplan & Verhoogen (2009) we decompose the
effects on average wages into estimated effects due to skill composition changes and
changes due to rent sharing. We compare these results with results obtained using
measures of skill composition and rent sharing available from typical firm level data.
We show that using linked worker-firm data allows us added insight behind the wage
increase mechanism because, in our case, the two sets of results do not conform; ratio
of educated to uneducated workers as a traditional measure for skill composition and
sales per employee as a measure of rent sharing cannot explain the average wage
increase. Our measure of composition and rent sharing constructed from the worker
level wage regression of the AKM type do.
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Table 2.1: Comparing characteristics between offshoring and non-offshoring firms
(2005)
All firms Offshoring Non-offshoring Regr. Mean
firms firms difference
No. of firms 5281 3007 2274
Means
Log (employees) 3.41 3.78 2.93 0.85***
(1.00) (1.09) (0.56) (0.02)
Log (sales) 17.05 17.70 16.19 1.20***
(1.36) (1.31) (0.87) (0.03)
Skill ratio, edu/non-edu 3.65 3.76 3.50 0.26**
(3.88) (4.15) (3.47) (0.11)
Log (EBIT per worker) 10.83 11.08 10.51 0.36***
(1.10) (1.12) (0.99) (0.04)
Log (hourly wage) 5.20 5.25 5.14 0.06***
(0.19) (0.17) (0.21) (0.01)
Note: Educated (edu.) means have more than high school education and non-educated (no edu.)
refers to less than or equal to twelve years of education. The last column gives difference in the
means between offshoring and non-offshoring firms; all regressions include industry fixed effect and
employment is included as additional control in all regressions except log(employees).*** implies
p<0.01.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of firm characteristic by type in 2002
wage sales/emp sales emp
Existing Offshoring 0.082*** 0.621*** 2.18*** 1.56***
Firms (0.012) (0.041) (0.112) (0.096)
New Offshoring 0.049*** 0.55*** 1.88*** 1.33***
Firms (0.016) (0.054) (0.128) (0.116)
Former Offshoring 0.084*** 0.682*** 2.12*** 1.44***
Firms (0.03) (0.143) (0.251) (0.235)
N 3336 3337 3337 3337
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. All regressions includes industry fixed effects. The
omitted group is firms not offshoring to China but offshoring to other low-middle income countries
and non-offshoring firms in 1999/2002.*** implies p<0.01.
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Table 2.3: Comparison of HS6 manufacturing imported consumption goods between
2002-2005 and 1999-2001
(a) HS6 Manufacturing imported consumption goods (2002-2005)
HS Code Description 2005 2002
160540 Crustaceans nes, prepared or preserved 53340799 1311804
711719 Imitation jewellery nes of base metal including plate 43417328 9816229
940360 Furniture, wooden, nes 38544723 1117227
030420 Fish fillets, frozen 33941755 3303811
620333 Mens, boys jackets, blazers, synthetic fibre, not kni 33804627 179689
620343 Mens, boys trousers shorts, synthetic fibre, not knit 32858528 12386218
392690 Plastic articles nes 26146710 17187523
940179 Seats with metal frames, nes 24050163 908627
950390 Toys nes 23540912 5684666
940490 Articles of bedding nes 21799778 8238720
(b) HS6 Manufacturing imported consumption goods (2001-1999)
HS Code Description 2001 1999
392690 Plastic articles nes 18687247 6150690
610711 Mens, boys underpants or briefs, of cotton, knit 16505069 18054200
030420 Fish fillets, frozen 14937704 136284
620343 Mens, boys trousers shorts, synthetic fibre, not knit 14733910 2602090
902190 Orthopaedic appliances, nes 12922589 6737316
950330 Construction sets and constructional toys, nes 11641092 3671195
040900 Honey, natural 9237678 4331478
030619 Crustaceans nes, frozen, 9110324 6118847
420231 Articles for pocket or handbag, leather outer surface 8706212 4630337
841840 Freezers of the upright type, < 900 litre capacity 8292136 1909480
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations Notes: Amounts are
in DKK. Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification
from CEPII. Rank gives the position of the commodity in DKK in the year 2002 and 1999.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of HS6 manufacturing imported intermediate goods between
2002-2005 and 1999-2001
(a) HS6 Manufacturing imported intermediate goods (2002-2005)
HS Code Description 2005 2002
848180 Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, nes 126744085 31182357
870839 Brake system parts except linings for motor vehicles 107457536 34315
848190 Parts of taps, cocks, valves or similar appliances 99517689 71550756
853400 Electronic printed circuits 82899720 39798006
732510 Cast articles, of non-malleable cast iron nes 62931197 1049846
841391 Parts of pumps for liquids 49542779 44151963
730723 Pipe fittings, butt welding of stainless steel 47028226 10519817
350790 Enzymes nes, prepared enzymes nes, except rennet 45636175 20757774
940390 Furniture parts nes 40444629 5836004
852990 Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes 39835005 3784459
(b) HS6 Manufacturing imported intermediate goods (2001-1999)
HS Code Description 2001 1999
851822 Multiple loudspeakers, mounted in single enclosure 114262840 32312257
760429 Bars, rods and other profiles, aluminium alloyed 67087534
841391 Parts of pumps for liquids 56487117 29320032
853400 Electronic printed circuits 40652653 3689736
851890 Parts of non-recording electronic equipment 35982391 6541136
848180 Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, nes 34947270 150615
848190 Parts of taps, cocks, valves or similar appliances 33820169 5482547
851829 Loudspeakers, nes 28085847 343302
850431 Transformers electric, power capacity < 1 KVA, nes 27948139 586888
730729 Pipe fittings of stainless steel except butt welding 26270529 46720486
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations Notes: Amounts are
in DKK. Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification
from CEPII. Rank gives the position of the commodity in DKK in the year 2002 and 1999.
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Table 2.5: Decomposing growth rate from China by intensive and extensive margin
(a) Decomposing imports from China (2002-2005)
Change share of increase
(M DKR) Extensive Intensive
Consumption 489 25% 75%
Intermediate 795 37% 63%
Total 1284 32% 68%
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations Notes: Classifi-
cation of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII.
Low/med income group excludes China.
(b) Decomposing imports from China (2002-2005) by firm types
Offshoring to China in 2002 Offshoring to China in 2003-2005
Change Share of increase Change Share of increase
(M DKR) Extensive Intensive (M DKR) Extensive Intensive
Consumption 350 30% 70% 139 100% 0
Intermediate 426 39% 61% 369 100% 0
Total 776 35% 65% 508 100% 0
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations.
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification
from CEPII. Last column contains firms offshoring to China in 2003-2005 period but not 2002.
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-difference estimates (2002-2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(avgwage) D(sk_ratio) D(sales/emp) D(offshore)
Offshoring in 2002 0.015*** 0.036*** 0.011 0.010***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.02) (0.002)
N 2119 2119 2119 2119
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regressions include industry fixed effects.
***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively. Dependent variable is differenced
over 2002-2005 period.
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Table 2.7: Difference-in-difference estimate by firm types (2002-2005)
1 2 3 4
D (avgwage) D (sk_ratio) D(sales/emp) D(offshore)
Existing Offshoring 0.015** 0.048** 0.003 0.02***
Firms (0.006) (0.020) (0.028) (0.005)
New Offshoring 0.027*** 0.041* 0.005 0.013***
Firms (0.009) (0.022) (0.040) (0.004)
Former Offshoring 0.003 0.006 -0.061 0.004
Firms (0.016) (0.033) (0.106) (0.002)
N 1915 1761 1915 1915
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regressions include industry fixed effects.
***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 2.8: Triple difference estimate by firm types
1 2 3 4
D (avgwage) D (sk_ratio) D(sales/emp) D(offshore)
Existing Offshoring 0.007 0.019 0.000 0.018***
Firms (0.009) (0.017) (0.038) (0.006)
New Offshoring 0.036*** 0.013 0.019 0.014***
Firms (0.012) (0.021) (0.059) (0.005)
Former Offshoring 0.002 -0.008 -0.172 0.022**
Firms (0.022) (0.040) (0.133) (0.01)
N 1293 1293 1293 1293
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent
levels respectively.
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Table 2.9: Worker level wage regression
dep var age age_sq experience experience_sq high_sk med_sk
wage 0.041*** -.0003*** 0.010*** -0.0003*** 0.460*** 0.395***
(0.0004) (0.000) (.0003) (0.000) (.0106) (.007)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis estimated with 50 bootstrap replications, clustering at level
of individuals. The regression includes time fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10
percent levels respectively. Number of observations 1106744.
74
Table 2.10: Difference-in-difference estimate using measures constructed from worker
level wage regression (2002-2005))
(1) (2) (3)
D avg_wage D sk_comp D rent_sh
Offshoring in 2002 0.012** 0.003* 0.009**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
N 1742 1742 1742
Note: Robust standard errors in the parentheses. All regressions include industry fixed effects.
**,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 2.11: Triple difference estimate using measures constructed from worker level
wage regression by firm types
1 2 3
D avg_wage D sk_comp D rent_sh
Existing Offshoring 0.012* 0.008* 0.005
Firms (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
New Offshoring 0.018* 0.001 0.017*
Firms (0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
Former Offshoring -0.027 -0.019 -0.008
Firms (0.024) (0.02) (0.015)
N 1272 1272 1272
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent
levels respectively.
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Table 2.12: Difference-in-difference estimates using alternate firm types (2002-2005)
1 2 3
D avg_wage D sk_comp D rent_sh
Offshoring in 0.013** 0.005* 0.008*
2002 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Offshoring after 0.011* 0.002 0.009*
2002 (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
N 1742 1742 1742
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects.
***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 2.13: Triple difference estimates using alternate firm types
1 2 3
D avg_wage D sk_comp D rent_sh
Offshoring in 0.016** 0.007** 0.009*
2002 (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Offshoring after 0.017* 0.009* 0.008
2002 (0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
N 1483 1483 1483
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent
levels respectively.
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Offshoring in 2002 0.018*** 0.005* 0.013***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
N 6253 6253 6253
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. All regressions include industry fixed effects.
***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively. Dependent variable is differenced
over 2002-2005 period.
Table 2.15: Triple difference estimate using manufacturing and non-manufacturing
firms
1 2 3
D avg_wage D sk_comp D rent_sh
Existing Offshoring 0.01* 0.012** -0.002
Firms (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
New Offshoring 0.02** 0.012* 0.009
Firms (0.01) (0.007) (0.08)
Former Offshoring -0.026* -0.013 -0.013
Firms (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
N 6808 6808 6808
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent
levels respectively.
Table 2.16: Triple difference estimates using firms offshoring to Czech Republic
1 2 3
D avg_wage D sk_comp D rent_sh
Existing Offshoring 0.012 0.003 0.010
Firms (0.011) (0.006) (0.010)
New Offshoring 0.002 -0.004 0.006
Firms (0.011) (0.005) (0.010)
Former Offshoring 0.014 0.002 0.011
Firms (0.019) (0.011) (0.015)
N 1468 1468 1468
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent
levels respectively.
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Table 2.17: Firm's share of imports coming from China (CN) between 1999 and 2005
No. of firms* 1999 2001 2002 2005
Firms not present in CN in 2002 402 16% 10% 15%
Firms not present in CN in 2002 but not in 1999 294 5% 6% 13%
Firms present in CN in 2002 1803 16% 17% 15% 22%
Firms present in CN before, in, and after 2002 805 16% 20% 20% 26%
Firms present before 2002 and again in 2005 45 11% 4% 8%
* Based on 2002
Source: Statistic Denmark's firm level external trade statistics, authors' calculations
Table 2.18: Danish firms importing from China (CN) and the Czech Republic (CZ)
No. of manufacturing firms Imports from CN.. Imports from CZ..
..in total ..and not CZ ..in total ..and not CN
Importers in 2002 3995 3391 1637 287
Importers in 2005 7033 6539 872 98
Not importing from either two in 2002 3015 3015
New to import from source 3038 580 -765 14
Note: CN stands for China and CZ for Czech Republic
Source: Statistic Denmark's firm level external trade statistics, authors' calculations
Table 2.19: Triple difference estimates using 2002-2004 as the shock period
1 2 3
D avg_wage D sk_comp D rent_sh
Existing Offshoring 0.014* 0.006 0.008
Firms (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
New Offshoring 0.0192* 0.001 0.018*
Firms (0.01) (0.005) (0.09)
Former Offshoring -0.027 -0.015 -0.005
Firms (0.024) (0.02) (0.016)
N 1360 1360 1360
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent
levels respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Chinese exports excluding Denmark (1995-2007)
Note: Authors' Calculation using Comtrade data
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Figure 2.2: Danish manufacturing imports from selected partners
Note: Growth rates of imports from China are between two and ten times the growth rates of
imports from Eastern Europe between 2002 and 2005. Source: External firm level trade statistics,
Statistics Denmark, own calculations
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Figure 2.3: Share of Danish firms sourcing from China (1999-2005)
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations Note: Values on left
hand axis relate to share of all firms importing from China. Values related to share of manufacturing
firms importing from China are on the right hand axis.
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Chapter 3
Offshoring and Wages with
Heterogeneous Firms and Workers: A
Theory Perspective
3.1 Introduction
Offshoring1 firms are found to pay higher average wages2. A wide array of
papers have looked at the impact of offshoring on wages3. However, a crucial question
remains unanswered: whether the higher wages is due to a change in the composition
of workers as a result of offshoring (skill composition effect) or because all existing
workers get higher pay (rent sharing effect) due to offshoring. This paper aims to fill
this gap by building a theory model that decomposes the wage effects of offshoring
into the two effects  those attributed to a change in composition of the workforce
and those attributed to a change in rent sharing. Understanding how these two
1Offshoring refers to relocating jobs from the home country to the foreign country.
2(Bernard et al. 2007).
3Feesntra and Hanson (1999), Hummels et al. (2009), Kramarz (2008), Sethupathy (2008) to
name a few.
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effects come into play is important for making policy decisions in the current scenario
of booming offshoring of both manufacturing tasks and other business functions.
This paper extends the Sethupathy (2008) model by introducing heterogeneous
workers to consider the firm-level impact of offshoring on wages through the two chan-
nels (composition effect and rent sharing effect). The key features of the model are as
follows. First, there are heterogeneous labors who vary at the skill level. I assume that
there are two types of workers  high-skilled and low-skilled. Second, the labor mar-
ket is imperfect. There is wage bargaining between firms and each type of worker that
yields rent sharing wage specifications. In particular, the wage of each type of worker
comprises of a share of firm specific rents (as a share in the firm's operating profits)
and a common outside option. Third, firms vary in terms of productivity a la Melitz
(2003). Fourth, there is opportunity for offshoring each type of task (high-skilled and
low-skilled)4, requiring a marginal cost that varies with the degree of non-routineness
of the task and a fixed cost. The presence of heterogeneous firms coupled with fixed
cost of offshoring implies that only the most productive firms would select into off-
shoring, whereas the less productive firms would be sourcing solely from the domestic
market. Fifth, the demand specification follows Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) leading
to endogenous markups. New offshoring opportunities reduce the marginal cost of
production and thus increase the firm's profitability. The offshoring induced higher
profits, due to the rent sharing wage specification, gets translated into higher wages of
all domestic workers leading to higher firm level average wages. Moreover, if one type
of task is offshored relatively more than the other then that would change the domes-
tic composition of workers in the firm and affect the average wage. For example, if
firms are offshoring low-skilled, low paid jobs then the average domestic wage would
automatically increase with offshoring. The interaction of the rent sharing effect and
the skill composition effect would determine how average wages are affected by an in-
crease in offshoring opportunity. Following Sethupathy (2008), in this paper I model
4The offshoring setup follows Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) model.
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the effects of marginal liberalization which has better scope for empirical testing than
a move from autarky to full offshoring. The main prediction of the model is that a
fall in the cost of offshoring increases average wage in the offshoring firm due to a rent
sharing effect. This effect can be further reinforced or weakened by an accompanying
skill composition effect. The average wages in the non-offshoring firms decline due to
a rent sharing effect only; there is no skill composition effect for these firms in the
model.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Production and Offshoring Technology
There are two types of labor in this model, high-skilled labor denoted by NH
and low-skilled labor denoted by NL. The economy produces two goods: X and Y ,
where Y is the homogeneous goods sector and is characterized by perfect competition
in both the product and the factor markets. Y is produced using both types of
labor under a simple constant returns to scale technology5. The two factors act as
perfect substitutes in the production of Y . The homogeneous goods sector acts as
the numeraire and there is no scope for offshoring in this sector.
Sector X is the differentiated goods sector and faces imperfections in the fac-
tor market and monopolistic competition in the product market. Production of X
requires both high-skilled and low-skilled labor, and I assume that there is no possi-
bility of substitution between the two factors. Firms pay a fixed entry cost (fe) to
learn their productivity parameter from the distribution G(φ). Once a firm makes
a productivity draw it then acts in two stages. In the first stage firms and workers
bargain with each other and set the wages. In the second stage, given the wages
from the first stage, firms maximize profits in a monopolistically competitive product
5We can assume Y = NH + αNL, where α ≤ 1, take α = 1 for simplicity.
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market. At this stage firms that expect to make negative profits will exit.
The production of a unit of good in sector X requires a continuum of low-
skilled tasks (referred to as L-tasks) and a continuum of high-skilled tasks (H-tasks).
The former tasks are performed by low-skilled labor only and the latter only by high-
skilled labor i.e. substitution between the different tasks is not allowed in this model.
Without loss of generality the measure of tasks employing labor of type-f is normalized
to equal one and indexed by zf  [0, 1] where f = {L,H}. Firms can undertake to
perform the tasks at home or abroad. Tasks can be performed offshore either within
or beyond the boundaries of the firm. The factor requirement is assumed to be the
same irrespective of the location of the tasks and the organizational form the firm
chooses in the foreign market. In this paper, the continuum of tasks zf , f = {L,H},
reflects that within skill types some tasks are easier to offshore than others; tasks
being ordered so that the cost of offshoring is non-decreasing. It is assumed that low
zf tasks are easier to offshore. The cost of offshoring a task is not related to the skill
level but instead, as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), reflects how difficult it
is to describe using rules-based logic, how important it is that the task be delivered
personally, and how difficult it is to transmit or transport the output of the activity
etc6.







where Nf (φ), f = {L,H}, stands for the employment of labor of type-f at a firm
with productivity level φ. It is assumed that each type-f task requires an equal share
ςf of Nf (φ) which is same for all firms in sector X. It follows that ςfNf (φ) units
6Blinder (2006) provides a discussion that the degree of offshorability of tasks is not related to
the skill level of a task but rather on the nature of the task i.e. whether it is routine or non-routine.
Leamer and Storper (2001) also distinguish tasks as those that require tacit information and are
difficult to offshore and those that are codifiable and hence vulnerable to offshoring. Similarly, Autor,
Levy, Murnane (2003) divide tasks on their degree of routineness, more routine tasks are easier to
offshore compared to non-routine ones.
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of type-f workers are employed to perform each task zf in the task space. Thus zf
also captures the share of type-f labor doing tasks in the interval [0, zf ] since ςf is a
constant.
The wage of type-f worker in the foreign country is w∗f and is exogenous in this
model. The cost of offshoring task zf is given by βf tf (zf )ςfNfw∗f . Offshoring a task is
assumed to involve two additional costs. The first is tf (zf ) with t′f (z) > 0, reflecting
that as tasks become more non-routine it is more difficult/ costly to undertake the
task from a distance irrespective of the skill level. To ensure that in equilibrium no
firm chooses to offshore all tasks it is assumed that Ltz→1t(z)→∞ (suppressing the
f subscript), i.e. the most non-routine tasks cannot be separated from the home firm.
There is also a policy related cost βf > 1 which is the same for all firms offshoring
type-f tasks and this represents the government regulation induced offshoring costs.
In order to keep the following exposition simple, I will assume that βL = βH = β.
Finally, firms in sector X can only offshore tasks, there is no trade in final goods in
this sector.
3.2.2 Wage Determination
The homogeneous goods sector Y faces a perfectly competitive labor market.
Workers receive their marginal product of labor w¯y as wage7. This sector also absorbs
the residual labor from sectorX. The labor market clearing condition of labor of type-
f is given by: Lf = LXf + L
Y




f are the demand for labor in sector
X and Y respectively.
The labor market in sector X is not perfectly competitive and works in the
following manner. First, all workers irrespective of their skill type start by searching
for jobs in sector X with the knowledge that if they are unable to find one they can
costlessly move to sector Y and earn w¯y. Workers and firms in sector X are randomly
7Note the assumption that the two types of workers are perfectly substitutable in the production
of Y implies that they have the same marginal product of labor and hence get the same wage.
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matched, however not all workers can find a successful match since labor supply
exceeds labor demand in sector X for any type of worker. The unmatched workers in
sector X are then absorbed in the other sector and receive a wage of w¯y. Anticipating
the outcome of the bargaining game, in the second stage, the firms decide on their
level of total employment of each type of worker, Nf , and the domestic employment
Ndf . I assume that for each type of worker there is a separate Nash-bargaining game
for splitting the surplus created from the match between firms and workers. The
surplus that accrues to the worker is the difference between wage earned at the firm
and the worker's outside option, which is to work in sector Y and earn w¯y. Since all
workers of type-f are exante identical they all agree or disagree to accept the job in
the same manner. Hence I assume that each type of worker as a group bargains with
the firm. The surplus for the firm is the profit earned by the union of the firm and
the two types of workers. For the firm, it is assumed that if no agreement is reached
between worker of a given type and the firm, then the latter fails to produce anything
and earns zero profit (the disagreement pay-off)8. In particular the firm bargains with
the two types of workers simultaneously assuming that the other type has agreed to






f (wf , .) (wf − w¯y)] + (1− θf ) lnΠ (3.2)
where θf [0, 1] is the exogenously given bargaining power of domestic worker of type-f
(Ndf ) versus the firm; and Π is the operating profit of the firm and also firm's surplus
from a successful bargaining. In the above set-up the firm only bargains over the
wages for each type of worker. The level of employment, both at home and abroad,
is determined in the second stage during product market competition9. Solving the
8This is because not all tasks can be offshored and each task needs to be performed to produce
X.
9See Abowd and Lemieux (2003) for details on this type of bargaining set-up.
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10 is the rent sharing parameter and is exogenous in this model. The details of
derivation of the wage specification can be found in appendix B.1. The wage speci-
fication implies that for a given type of worker, a firm with higher operating profits
per worker would be paying higher wages11.
3.2.3 Demand
Consumer preferences follow the quasi-linear specification of Melitz and Otta-
viano (2008) which generates endogenous mark-ups for firms. In an economy with
L12 units of consumers, the demand function can be written as:
















with the measure of set I representing the mass of goods produced in sector X. qy
and qi represents the consumption of the homogeneous and the differentiated goods,
respectively, by a consumer. The parameter ρ indexes the substitution between the
differentiated good i and good Y . λ on the other hand, indexes the substitution
between the aggregate good X and good Y . Lastly, γ indexes the degree of product
differentiation among the differentiated goods in I. The quasi-linear utility function
implies that there is no income effect for change in the consumption of the differ-
entiated goods. The monopolistic competition framework means that each firm is a
10ηf is a function of θf and the wage elasticities with respect to N
d
f .
11Note that the firm size wage premium is ensured by the assumption that the firm's search cost
associated with each type of worker, bf (φ), is increasing in φ. In that case it can be shown that
wf = bf in equilibrium.
12L consists of total number of individuals in the economy, assuming that preferences are same
irrespective of skill type.
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monopolist in its own good but faces competition from other goods, which are imper-
fect substitutes since (γ > 0). The inverse demand function obtained from consumer's
constrained optimization exercise can be written as:
pi = ρ− γqi − λQx (3.5)
where Qx gives the total consumption of the aggregate good X. The demand for the












M stands for the measure of consumed varieties from the demand side (or the measure















Any firm setting p ≥ pmax hits zero demand for the good and earns zero profits as
well.
3.3 Benchmark Case of Limited Offshoring
3.3.1 Production under Limited Offshoring
Since a move from complete autarky to a fully open economy is not truly
testable empirically, hence following Sethupathy (2008), I consider the benchmark
case as one with limited offshoring and then go on to investigate the comparative static
effects of a marginal liberalization. In sectorX, there is a continuum of firms, each
producing a different good, i. The firms in this sector would like to take advantage
of cheaper wages abroad in the product market competition stage. However sending
tasks abroad involves paying a common fixed cost, fo, that is related to setting up
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production facilities abroad. Note that since the ensuing discussions are from the
point of view of an individual firm so the subscript i will be dropped henceforth.
Since demand is linear, and p is decreasing in φ (shown in appendix B.2a), there
exists a unique φ¯ such that p(φ¯) = pmax and Π(φ¯) = 0. Hence, φ¯ serves as a cut-off to
partition firms between those that exit (φ < φ¯) and those that stay active (φ ≥ φ¯ )
and earn non-negative profits. Since the benefits from offshoring increase with scale,
the fixed costs, fo in terms of the numeraire good, partition firms into those that
choose to offshore and purely domestic firms who source from home. Appendix B.4
proves the existence of and defines the productivity cut-off φ¯o that partitions firms
into ones that offshore and ones that do not. The following summarizes the cut-offs
separating the different types of firms in this model:

φ > φ¯0 → offshore
φ¯0 ≥ φ ≥ φ¯ → produce domestically
φ < φ¯ → exit
Let z¯f be the marginal task performed at home by factor-f. This cutoff is determined
by the condition that the wage savings from sending the job abroad just balance the
offshoring costs, making the firm's marginal cost of the offshored task the same as the
marginal cost of performing that task domestically. For type-f labor this condition is:
βtf (z¯f )w
∗
f = wf (3.8)
where wf is solved in equation 3.10. I assume that βtf (0)w∗f < wf for all firms so that
if there were no fixed costs of offshoring, all firms would have found it profitable to
offshore some jobs. Appendix B.3b demonstrates that in equilibrium, more productive
firms offshore a higher share of both types of tasks. This happens because more
productive firms pay higher domestic wages hence the scope for cost savings from
offshoring any given task are also greater and hence they are able to move further up
the tf (zf ) schedule.
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Next, the total variable cost of the firm can be expressed as: w˜LNL + w˜HNH
where, w˜f = wf (1 − z¯f ) + w∗fβ
´ z¯f
0 tf (z¯f )
Nf
13. The marginal cost can be derived as:
c = w˜LaL+w˜HaH
φ






15. Using the above definitions and equations (3.3) and
(3.8), I can solve for the key variables, pif , wf and c of a firm as:
pif =
pφ− τHaH − τLaL − w¯y(ξLaL + ξHaH)
afξf (1 + η˜)
(3.9)
wf =
pφηf − (τjaj + τfaf )ηf + w¯y[(1 + ηj)ξfaf − ηfξjaj]
afξf (1 + η˜)
(3.10)
c =
η˜pφ+ τHaH + τLaL + w¯y(ξLaL + ξHaH)
φ(1 + η˜)
(3.11)
where f = {L, H}, j 6= f, τf = w∗fβ
´ z¯f
0 tf (z¯f )
Nf
, ξf = (1 − z¯f ) and η˜ = (ηH + ηL).
The equilibrium values of firms that do not offshore is obtained by setting z¯f = 0
in equations 3.9-3.11. From the above equations, we can show that pif and wf are
increasing with firm productivity, while c is falling in firm productivity. Moreover,
due of lower marginal costs, more productive firms set lower prices allowing them to
achieve higher markups, and produce more16.
The firms in sectorX set prices to maximize profits Π = pq−(w˜LNL+w˜HNH)−
fo. It is not possible to solve for prices explicitly in this model. The following function
implicitly defines a firm's optimal price (p) as:








13For firms that do not offshore z¯f is zero.
14Note that in equilibrium Nf =
q
φaf
15I assume that the search cost is sunk at the time of firm's optimization decisions and hence does
not affect the operating profit or the marginal cost. Altering this assumption gives qualitatively
similar results to those obtained here.
16Proofs are provided in appendix B.2
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where q is determined by equation 3.5 and c is defined by equation 3.11 above. This
implicit function will be crucial in determining how prices and other key firm-level
variables respond to a shock to offshoring costs. Finally, from equation 3.12, we can




(1 + η˜)(p− c) (3.13)
3.3.2 Equilibrium under Limited Offshoring
In sector X firm entry and exit patterns follow the Melitz (2003) model. Firms
are identical prior to entry and must pay a sunk entry cost, fe, to observe the firm-
specific productivity draw from a cumulative distribution G(φ) with density g(φ)
over the support [1;∞). G(φ) is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution given by the
following distribution and density functions:
G(φ) = 1− ( 1
φ







Having defined the cutoff productivity for entry φ¯, the ex-post distribution of pro-












ifφ ≥ φ¯ (3.15)







where M is the endogenously determined equilibrium mass of firms in the sector.
Hence, φ˜ is the productivity of the firm that has the average level of offshoring in
the sector17. This average productivity is relevant for defining the equilibrium in the
17Since it is assumed that βtf (0)w
∗
f < wf , it follows that if a firm decides to offshore, then it will
offshore both types of jobs. Thus φ˜H = φ˜L = φ˜.
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economy. Following Melitz (2003), the equilibrium in sector X is characterized by
two conditions. First, the zero-cutoff profit (ZCP) condition asserts that the profits
of the marginal entrant should be zero ( Π(φ¯) = 0 ). Using this condition, and φ˜
defined above the average sectoral profits (Π¯) can be solved for using:
Π¯(φ¯) = Π(φ˜) ZCP (3.17)
In addition to the ZCP condition, the equilibrium structure in this sector is defined
by the free entry condition: expected profits from firm entry in sector X should equal
the sunk entry cost (fe), thereby setting the expected payoffs equal to zero, ex-ante.
The FE condition can be written as:
[1−G(φ¯)]Π¯(φ¯) = fe
⇒ Π¯(φ¯) = (φ¯)kfe FE
(3.18)
Appendix B.5 demonstrates how the ZCP and FE conditions behave in the (Π¯; φ¯)
space and proves the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under sufficient condi-
tions. Finally, to balance trade, it is assumed that exports of the numeraire good pay
for the aggregate offshoring bill.
3.4 Comparative Statics
3.4.1 Firm's Response to a Fall in the Cost of Offshoring
In this section I examine how firms in sector X respond to an exogenous fall in
the marginal costs of offshoring, which occurs through a relaxation in the policy con-
straint, β. Appendix B.3 shows that as long as a sufficient conditions (see equation
B.2 and B.3  the technological slack conditions), are satisfied, a fall in β increases
offshoring of task-f along the intensive margin, since firms will respond by increasing
z¯f . The technological slack conditions ensure that firms have not hit their technolog-
ical constraint, above which offshoring becomes technologically too costly, despite a
94
fall in β. If firms that are already offshoring have offshored much of their activities
then we would not expect a fall in β to affect the level of offshoring of tasks at the
intensive margin. There will, however, also be a rise in offshoring along the extensive
margin, since the fall in the marginal cost of offshoring implies that the new firms
will begin offshoring as well (appendix B.4b shows that φ¯o falls with β).
To simplify the exposition of the comparative statics, firms can be split up
into three categories. The first group consists of firms that are the most productive
and that were offshoring before and continue to offshore after the shock. The next
group are the new entrants to offshoring. The last category are the firms that do not
source from abroad before and after the fall in β. For the first group of firms, a fall
in β reduces the cost of previously offshored tasks as well as allows new tasks to be
offshored  the marginal tasks. For the second group the entire cost saving comes
from the newly offshored tasks, i.e. the marginal tasks since by definition there is no
infra-marginal tasks for this group of firms.
The following propositions summarize the firm-level effects from a fall in the
policy-related offshoring costs, β.
Proposition 1: For new and existing offshorers, a fall in β reduces prices
(p) and marginal costs (c), while raising markups (µ), operating profits
per domestic worker of type-f (pif), and domestic wages of type-f workers
(wf).
A fall in β reduces the costs of continuing offshoring firms along both marginally
and inframarginally offshored type-f tasks (productivity effect), allowing these firms to
lower prices and move down their linear demand schedule and increase their output.
Additionally, since demand becomes more inelastic at lower prices, firms are able
to increase their markups, µ, leading to higher operating profits, which are shared
with both types of domestic workers, thus raising their wages through a rent sharing
effect. For the firms who newly begin offshoring as a result of fall in β, the effects
are similar to that of the existing offshoring firms. Appendix B.6 contains the proof
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of Proposition1.
Proposition 2: For the non-offshoring firms, a fall in β reduces the firm's
markups (µ), operating profits per domestic worker of type-f (pif), and
domestic wages of type-f workers (wf).
Purely domestic firms are negatively affected by a fall in β. The more pro-
ductive firms who can take advantage of offshoring lower prices thus shifting in the
demand schedules of the non-offshoring firms. This causes their markups to fall, which
translates into lower operating profits and consequently lower wages of all existing
workers at these firms. For these firms the rent sharing effect lowers the wages of
all workers. The proofs are provided in Appendix B.7. The above two propositions
imply that in terms of wages, existing workers at the offshoring firms gain, whereas
those at the non-offshoring ones lose.
Proposition 3: For sufficiently small γ, new offshoring opportunities lead
to a reallocation of production and both types of labor from the non-
offshoring firms towards the new and existing offshorers. For the off-
shoring firms, the net effect of offshoring on home employment and the
share of unskilled labor is ambiguous. However, at non-offshoring firms
employment falls but the share of unskilled workers remain unaffected.
Proposition 1, shows that a fall in β allows the firms that can take advantage of
offshoring to reduce prices, thereby increasing their competitiveness compared to non-
offshorers. This results in a shift of production towards the former group of firms. The
fall in the demand for output for the non-offshoring firms leads to a fall in employment
of both types of labor, since production and labor demand are proportional. Since
there is no scope for substitution of tasks between the two types of labor, the share of
unskilled workers remains unaffected for the firms that never offshore i.e. there is no
change in the skill composition. On the other hand, the effect on home employment
for the offshoring firms is ambiguous because the employment gain due to increase
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in production is offset by the loss of jobs due to offshoring. The effect on the share
of unskilled workers in the home firm is also ambiguous and depends on which type
of tasks is relatively easier to offshore. For example if unskilled tasks are easier to
offshore then the share of unskilled workers in the domestic workforce would fall in
the offshoring firms.The proofs are provided in appendix B.6f and B.7f.
Proposition 4: A fall in β increases the average domestic wage in the
offshoring firms due to a rent sharing effect. This effect can be further
reinforced or weakened by an accompanying skill composition effect. Av-
erage wages in the non-offshoring firms, however, declines due to a rent
sharing effect only; there is no skill composition effect for these firms.
This is the main prediction of the model and follows directly from Propositions
1-3. The proof of the proposition is provided in appendix B.6g and B.7g. The above
proposition shows that offshoring affects average wages (in firms that offshore) in two
ways: on the one hand, it can increase the wages of all existing workers through a rent
sharing effect, if firms share offshoring induced increase in profits with its workers. On
the other hand offshoring can also change the workforce composition in the home firm,
thus affecting average wages through a skill composition effect. In which direction
the skill composition works is ambiguous and ultimately an empirical question.
In summary, a fall in offshoring costs allows new and existing offshoring firms to
gain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis purely domestic firms. This leads to diverging
effects on markups, operating profits per domestic worker, and domestic wages. Fur-
thermore, offshoring potentially can reallocate production and employment from non-
offshoring firms to the offshoring ones. Becker and Muendler (2008) find supporting
evidence for Germany. Using employer-employee linked data, they find that expand-
ing MNCs retain more jobs than competitors without foreign expansion. Similarly,
the empirical analysis of Sethupathy (2008) finds no differential outcomes in employ-
ment between offshoring and non-offshoring firms. However the empirical analysis by
Fosse and Maitra (2010) using Danish employer-employee data finds that firms that
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increase offshoring hire at a lower rate compared to those that do not. The paper also
finds that offshoring can affect firm level wages by increasing both skill composition
and rent sharing effects, especially for firms that continue offshoring.
3.4.2 Sector Level Analysis
To determine the effect of the marginal liberalization we need to examine how
the ZCP and the FE conditions are affected due to a fall in the cost of offshoring.
While the FE condition remains unchanged, the ZCP condition is affected by off-
shoring. Appendix B.8 demonstrates that the ZCP curve must shift up in response
to increased offshoring that leads to a higher φ¯ and higher Π¯ in the post-offshoring
equilibrium. Let the initial cutoff productivity be denoted as φ¯1. Then, firms with
productivity φ¯1 < φ < φ¯2, must exit the industry, where φ¯2 is the new cut-off. This
means that the new offshoring opportunity drives out less productive firms.
Let us look at how the sector-level variables respond to increased offshoring.
Average prices in sector X, Px, decrease with offshoring for two reasons. First, prices
decrease at the offshoring firms, both new and existing ones. Second, the least pro-
ductive firms with the highest prices exit. Average productivity also increases since
the least productive firms exit the industry following increased offshoring opportunity.
The same line of argument implies that, average industry profitability and average
wages also increase. The effect of marginal liberalization on employment of type-f
worker and the share of unskilled labor in sector X is ambiguous. First we discuss
the effect on employment. Employment of both types of workers fall as a result of
three effects: contraction of non-offshoring firms, exit of the least productive firms,
and offshoring of jobs by new and continuing offshorers. However, the offshoring
firms also expand thus increasing the demand for labor. If the expansionary effect
offsets the loss of jobs at the less productive firms plus the direct loss of jobs, the
net employment effect can be positive. The share of unskilled workers in the sector
is affected only through the firms that take advantage of offshoring. If the firms are
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offshoring unskilled tasks relatively more then the average share of unskilled workers
will fall. However, which type of task ends up being offshored more depends on the
type of activities, the wages abroad and the technology factor tf (zf ).
3.5 Conclusion
This paper builds a theory model to investigate the effect of offshoring on firm
level average wages, with a focus on the different channels through which wages might
be affected. There are two channels: the first is called the skill composition effect and
affects the firm level average wage by changing the work-force composition at these
firms. The second effect, called the rent sharing effect, works through imperfections
in the labor market. A fall in the cost of offshoring, by reducing cost, increases
profitability at the firms that take advantage of offshoring. The offshoring induced
increased profits can be shared with all workers through bargaining between firms
and workers, leading to a higher pay for all existing workers and thus resulting in
higher average wages.
Papers studying the effect of offshoring usually focus on one channel shutting
down the other. However, it is essential to take into account both effects, since they
can potentially work in opposite directions. This paper provides a simple model
to analyze both effects simultaneously. The model extends Sethupathy (2008) by
introducing heterogeneous labor with the scope for offshoring tasks performed by the
different types of labor. The technology associated with offshoring is different for the
two types of tasks, though there is a common policy related cost of offshoring. The
presence of heterogeneous firms and fixed costs of offshoring implies that only the more
productive firms are able to take advantage of offshoring opportunities. Offshoring
enables these firms to experience productivity gains, which raises profitability. The
offshoring induced higher profits, due to the rent sharing mechanism, gets translated
into higher wages for all domestic workers leading to higher average wages in the
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offshoring firms. Moreover, if one type of task is offshored more than the other that
would change the domestic composition of workers in the firm and affect its average
wage. For example, if firms are offshoring low-paid, low-skilled jobs then average
domestic wages would automatically increase with offshoring. The interaction of
the rent sharing effect and the skill composition effect would determine how average
wages are affected following an increase in offshoring. The main prediction of the
model is that a fall in the cost of offshoring increases average wage in the offshoring
firm due to a rent sharing effect. This effect can be further reinforced or weakened
by an accompanying skill composition effect. Average wages in the non-offshoring
firms declines due to a rent sharing effect only; there is no skill composition effect
for these firms in the model. The empirical paper by Fosse and Maitra (2010), using
Danish employer-employee data, supports the predictions of this model. They show
that both rent sharing and skill composition effects are important for explaining the
wage effects of offshoring.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Merging Firm Level Data with the Transactions
Level Customs Data
We use phone number and zip code to merge the two datasets, following Yu
(2011). The phone numbers in the product level trade data include area phone codes
and a hyphen, whereas those in the firm-level production data do not. Therefore, we
use the last seven digits of the phone number to serve a proxy for firm identification.
A.2 Construction of TFP (Olley-Pakes)
Here we describe in details the Olley-Pakes approach to estimating firm's TFP
with some extensions. First, we adopt different price deflators for inputs and outputs.
Data on input deflators and output deflators are from Brandt et al. (2011) in which
the output deflators are constructed using reference price information from China's
Statistical Yearbooks whereas input deflators are constructed based on output defla-
tors and China's national input-output table (2002).
Next, we construct the real investment variable using the perpetual inventory
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method. Rather than assigning an arbitrary number for the depreciation ratio, we
use the firm's real depreciation rate provided by the Chinese firm-level dataset.








Where Yit is the output of firm i in year t, Kit, Lit andMit denotes labor, capi-
tal, and intermediate inputs, respectively. By assuming that the expectation of future
realization of the unobserved productivity shock, vit, relies on its contemporaneous
value, the firm i's investment is modeled as an increasing function of both unobserved
productivity and log capital, kit = log(Kit). Following previous works, such as van
Biesebroeck (2005) and Amiti and Konings (2007), we add the firm's export decision
as an extra argument of the investment function since most firms' export decisions
are determined in the previous period (Tybout, 2003):
Iit = I˜(kit, vit, Xit) (A.2)
where Xit is a dummy to measure whether firm i exports in year t. Therefore, the
inverse function of Iit is:
vit = I˜
−1(kit, Iit, Xit) (A.3)
The unobserved productivity also depends on log capital and the firm's export deci-
sions. Accordingly, the estimation specification can now be written as:
yit = β0 + βmmit + βllit + g(kit, Iit, Xit) + it (A.4)
where g(kit, Iit, Xit) is defined as βkkit + I˜−1(kit, Iit, Xit). Following Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Amiti and Konings (2007), fourth-order polynomials are used in log-
capital, log-investment and firm's export dummy to approximate g(.). In addition,
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we also include a WTO dummy (i.e., one for a year after 2001 and zero for before) to
characterize the function g(.) as follows:










After finding the estimated coefficients βm and βl, we calculate the residual Rit
which is defined as:
Rit = lnYit − βˆmlnMit − βˆllnLit
The next step is to obtain an unbiased estimated coefficient of βˆk. We assume
firm's productivity follows a exogenous Markov process, vit = h(vit−1)+ηit. To correct
the selection bias due to firm exit, Amiti and Konings (2007) suggested estimating
the probability of a survival indicator on a high-order polynomial in log-capital and
log-investment. One can then accurately estimate the following specification:
Rit = βklnKit + h(gˆit−1 − βklnKi,t−1, pˆri,t−1) + ∗it (A.6)
where pˆri,t−1 denotes the fitted value for the probability of the firm's exit in the
next year, and ∗it = it + ηit denotes the composite error. Since the specific true
functional form of the inverse function h is unknown, it is appropriate to use fourth-
order polynomials in git−1 and ki,t−1 to approximate that. In addition, A.6 also
requires the estimated coefficients of the log-capital in the first and second term to be
identical. Therefore, non-linear least squares is used (Pavcnik, 2002; Arnold, 2005).
Finally, the Olley-Pakes type of TFP for each firm i in industry j is obtained once
the once the estimated coefficient bˆk is obtained:
TFPOPit = lnYit − βˆmlnMit − βˆklnKit − βˆllnLit (A.7)
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A.3 Replicating counter-Melitz Finding in the Merged
Data
Table A.1: Exporters productivity vs. ownership
Dependent variables
Value Added per worker TFP (Olley Pakes)
All Firms FIE non-FIE All Firms FIE non-FIE
exporters 0.183* -0.036* 0.208* 0.146* -0.003 0.201*
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
N 427849 72630 355219 446020 74764 371256
R-squared 0.196 0.236 0.211 0.338 0.338 0.343
Note: The above table reports regressions of the dependent variable on exporter dummy, omitted
group is non-exporter. All regressions include industry, province and year fixed effects and labor as
additional controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, †
p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
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Table A.2: Exporter productivity vs. capital intensity
(a) Using Value-Added per Worker as Dependant Variable
Labor intensive Medium Capital intensive
exporter -0.189* -0.118* 0.049†
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022)
Observations 110940 189700 127209
R-squared 0.137 0.132 0.155
Note: The above tables report regressions of the dependent variable on exporter dummy, omitted
group is non-exporter. All regressions include industry, province and year fixed effects as addi-
tional controls. Regressions are run by capital intensity of the sectors. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
(b) Using Value-Added per Worker as Dependant Variable and Controlling
for Size
Labor intensive Medium Capital intensive
exporter 0.015 0.088* 0.180*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.022)
Observations 110940 189700 127209
R-squared 0.204 0.182 0.181
Note: The above tables report regressions of the dependent variable on exporter dummy, omitted
group is non-exporter. All regressions include industry, province and year fixed effects and firm size
as additional controls. Regressions are run by capital intensity of the sectors. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
(c) Using TFP (Olley-Pakes) as Dependant Variable
Labor intensive Medium Capital intensive
exporter 0.051* 0.126* 0.261*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.02)
Observations 116120 197066 132834
R-squared 0.254 0.371 0.294
Note: The above tables report regressions of the dependent variable on exporter dummy, omitted
group is non-exporter. All regressions include industry, province and year fixed effects as
additional controls. Regressions are run by capital intensity of the sectors. Robust standard errors
in parentheses clustered at the firm level.* p<0.01, † p<0.05, ††p<0.1.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Solution to the Bargaining Game
In order to solve equation 3.2, we first solve the firm's profit maximization
exercise in the second stage product market competition and work backwards.
The firm's profit maximization problem can be written as:
Maxp pq(p)− c(q(p), wL, wH , .) (B.1)







Tf (z¯f ) =
´ z¯f
0
tf (z¯f ). It follows:
∂c(q(p),wL,wH ,.)
∂wf
= Ndf . From equation B.1, using
the envelope theorem we can show that dΠ
dwf
= −Ndf . This condition is used to solve
for equation 3.2 yielding equation 3.3. Check the solution for the right-to-manage
model in Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Estevao and Tevlin (2003) for details.
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B.2 Comparative Statics with Respect to Productiv-
ity
This section provides proofs of how the firm level variables behave with firm produc-
tivity. We show that (a) dp
dφ
< 0 ; (b) dc
dφ
< 0; (c) dµ
dφ
> 0; (d) dq
dφ





> 0 ; (g) dwf
dφ
> 0. For expositional simplicity we assume z¯f = 0 in the derivations.
(a) To show dp
dφ
< 0:
We begin by using the D(p, φ, .) function given by equation 3.12 that implicitly solves





















= −w¯y(aL + aH)
2(φ)2
< 0
Thus prices are lower at more productive firms.
(b) To show dc
dφ
< 0:
Using equation 3.11 and then taking derivative with respect to φ and substituting in
for dp
dφ
from part (a) gives:
dc
dφ
= −w¯y(aL + aH)(2 + η˜)
2(φ)2(1 + η˜)
< 0
Thus marginal costs are also lower at more productive firms.















, indicating that markups are
higher at more productive firms.










> 0 since dµ
dφ
> 0 and dq
dφ
> 0. Thus aggregate operating
profits is increasing in firm productivity.
(e) To show dpif
dφ
> 0:
Using equation 3.9 and then taking derivative with respect to φ and substituting in
for dp
dφ




2pφ− w¯y(aL + aH)
2φaf (1 + η˜)
> 0
To see why the numerator in the above expression must be positive, set z¯f = 0 in
equation 3.9, to get the equilibrium solution for pif for purely domestic firms. Since
pif must be positive in equilibrium, the expression pφ− w¯y(aL + aH) must be positive
and so the numerator of the expression above must also be positive.
(f) To show dwf
dφ
> 0:








(g) To show dq
dφ
> 0:
Taking the derivative of equation 3.6 with respect to φ and again plugging in for dp
dφ













B.3 Comparative Statics for the Task Cut-offs
(a) To show that dz¯f
dβ
> 0, i.e. a fall in cost of offshoring leads to higher off-
shoring we use equation 3.8 to implicitly define the cut-offs (z¯L, z¯H) as: βtL(z¯L)w∗L =
wL for low-skilled jobs and βtH(z¯H)w∗H = wH for high-skilled ones. For simplicity
we show the two extreme cases1, first we assume that there is no offshoring in high-
1The two extreme cases are shown here for expositional ease, qualitatively similar results can be
obtained without the assumption of only one type of task being offshored.
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skilled jobs i.e. z¯H = 0. Substituting equation 3.10 for wL, gives the following implicit
function for the productivity cut-off for low-skilled tasks:
FL(z¯L, β) = βtL(z¯L)(1−z¯L)w∗LaL(1+η˜)−pφηL+βt¯L(z¯L)w∗LaLηL−w¯y[(1+ηH)(1−z¯L)aL−aHηL] = 0



















LaLηL + w¯y(1 +ηH)aL
Note, that if ∂FL
∂z¯L
> 0 is satisfied, which is called the first technological slack condition,
then dz¯L
dβ
< 0. The condition is:
[βt
′




LaLηL + w¯y(1 + ηH)aL > 0
(B.2)
Similarly, to show dz¯H
dβ
< 0, we assume z¯L = 0 and use the implicit function for the
productivity cut-off for high-skilled tasks:
FH = βtH(z¯H)(1−z¯H)w∗HaH(1+η˜)−pφηH+βt¯H(z¯H)w∗HaHηH−w¯y[(1+ηL)(1−z¯H)aH−aLηH ] = 0




















Note, that if ∂FH
∂z¯H
> 0 is satisfied, which is called the second technological slack
condition, then dz¯H
dβ
< 0. The condition is:
[βt
′






As long as the technological slack conditions hold, a fall in β increases offshoring
of both types of tasks by firms that were already offshorers. This happens if the
technological cost tf (.) does not increase too steeply with tasks or if cost savings are
large because of high w¯y, or low β, or low w∗f .
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(b) To show dz¯f
dφ
> 0 i.e. offshoring of type-f task is increasing in productivity.
Again, for simplicity we show the two extreme cases, first we assume that there is
no offshoring in high-skilled jobs i.e. z¯H = 0 and show
dz¯L
dφ
> 0. From the implicit










= −pηL − φηL dp
dφ
= −ηL2pφ− w¯y(aL + aH)
2φ
< 0
The sign follows from the same logic as in appendix B.2f. ∂FL
∂z¯L
> 0 from the techno-
logical slack condition given in equation B.2. Hence it follows that as long as the first
technological slack condition holds we can show dz¯L
dφ
> 0.
Next to show dz¯H
dφ
> 0 we assume that there is no offshoring in low-skilled jobs i.e.











= −pηH − φηH dp
dφ
= −ηH 2pφ− w¯y(aL + aH)
2φ
< 0
Again, the sign follows from the same logic as in appendix B.2f. Note that ∂FH
∂z¯H
> 0
from the technological slack condition given in equation B.3. Hence it follows that as
long as the second technological slack condition holds we can show dz¯H
dφ
> 0.
B.4 Existence of Productivity Cut-offs
(a) Prove existence of φ¯o:
The exposition is similar to the one provided in Sethupathy (2008). The sunk costs
of offshoring, fo, pin down a productivity cut-off, φ¯o, such that firms with φ > φ¯o are
able to offshore and firms with φ < φ¯o are unable to offshore. Thus, if this cut-off
exists then there is a firm at the margin who is indifferent between offshoring and
not offshoring. To show such a cut-off exists, we begin by noting that offshoring,
by saving on wages, allows a firm to lower its marginal costs, c, and become more
efficient. Hence, for any firm with productivity φ, co(φ) < c(φ), where co(φ) represents
the firm's marginal costs with offshoring, and c(φ) represents the firm's marginal
costs with no offshoring. Define φ1 such that c(φ1) = co(φ). We also know that
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c(φ1) < c(φ) and using the proof from appendix B.2b, we can conclude that φ1 > φ.
Hence offshoring by reducing costs make the firm effectively more productive. From
appendix B.2d, we know that firms with higher productivity achieve higher profits.
So we can define φ¯o as the productivity level at which firm is indifferent between
offshoring and becoming more efficient and not offshoring:
Π(φ1(φ¯o))− fo = Π(φ¯o) (B.4)
(b) A marginal liberalization increases offshoring:
A fall in β provides an even greater efficiency boost from offshoring, which is proved
in appendix B.6. Hence, the original marginal firm is making positive profits in the
new equilibrium after a fall in β. For any given φ, φ1(φ¯o) is higher than before. Then,
for the equality in equation B.4 to hold, φ¯o must fall allowing for new offshoring
opportunities.
B.5 Proving Existence and Uniqueness of Equilib-
rium
I begin by deriving the behavior of the FE curve in the (Π¯; φ¯) space. The FE
condition is given by:
Π¯(φ¯) = (φ¯)kfe
The first derivative is given by :
Π¯
′
(φ¯) = k(φ¯)(k−1)fe > 0
The second derivative is :
Π¯
′′
(φ¯) = k(k − 1)(φ¯)(k−2)fe > 0
Hence, the FE curve is upward sloping and convex in the (Π¯; φ¯) space as long as
(k > 1).
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In order to analyze the ZCP condition recall equation 3.17 can be written as:
Π¯ = Π(φ˜) = q(φ˜)µ(φ˜)− fo
Plugging in equation 3.13, which gives the profit maximizing level of output, in the
above condition we get:
Π¯ = Π(φ˜) =
L
γ









(1 + η˜) > 0
The above inequality follows from appendix B.2c which shows dµ
dφ
> 0. Next, we can
show that dφ˜
dφ¯
> 0 by examining equation 3.16. First, by definition, the number of
active firms, M , falls as φ¯ rises. Also, the total amount of offshoring (the numera-
tor of equation 3.16) increases with φ¯ because as φ¯ rises, there is less competition










Hence, both the FE and the ZCP curves are increasing in the (Π¯; φ¯) space. To
prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium we look at the curvature of ZCP




























 (1 + η˜) > 0
Using the results from appendix B.2a and B.2b, we get that for sufficiently
small w¯y, the above second derivative is negative. Next, to sign φ˜′′(φ¯) let us assume
that there is a continuous, one-to-one relationship between φ˜ and φ¯, define the inverse
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function φ¯(φ˜), and the distribution of φ˜ as υ(φ˜). Then, we can find the distribution
of φ˜ in the following way:
υ(φ˜) = ϕ[φ¯(φ˜)]φ¯′(φ˜)
Following the logic in Sethupathy (2008), as long as the distribution of φ˜ is
sufficiently downward sloping, we get that φ¯′′(φ˜)< 0. Note that φ˜ has a pareto
distribution, and the sufficient condition requires that the shape parameter for υ(φ˜)
is greater than or equal to the shape parameter for ϕ(φ¯). Finally, since there is
a one-to-one mapping between φ˜ and φ¯ , we can conclude that φ˜′′(φ¯)< 0. Under
these sufficient conditions we can show that equation B.5, d
2Π¯
dφ¯2
< 0. This implies
that the ZCP condition is increasing but decelerating in the (Π¯; φ¯) space. On the
other hand, the FE condition is increasing and accelerating. The final step to confirm
the uniqueness and existence of an equilibrium requires that the FE condition at
(φmin = 1) must be below the ZCP at (φmin = 1), i.e. FE cuts ZCP from below,
which can be satisfied if fe; γ are small enough or L is large enough.
B.6 How a Fall in β Affects the Offshoring Firms
This section provides proofs of how the firm level variables behave with fall in the




> 0; (b) dc
O
dβ













We begin by defining the cost savings (CS) from a fall in β as the partial of
















The terms in the first parenthesis captures the savings due to fall in β that
accrue to tasks that were already offshored. The two terms in the second parenthesis
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captures the savings on new marginal tasks that are offshored due to the fall in β.
The second term must be non-negative. If the technological wall has been hit, then
dz¯f
dβ
= 0 and the second term disappears. If not, then by appendix B.3a, dz¯f
dβ
< 0 and
the whole term becomes positive. Hence, we can definitely sign CS as positive.




We recall that theD(pO, β, .) function (equation 3.12) implicitly solves for the optimal



































> 0 captures the partial effect of the demand curve shifting in for all firms
as the price level falls in sector X and can be seen by examining equation 3.6. To




to the first expression in ∂D
∂β
and thus drop it.















Thus marginal costs falls as β falls.










indicating that markups increase as the










< 0. For simplicity we assume that there is no offshoring in
high-skilled jobs i.e. z¯H = 0. Now using equation 3.9 and then taking the derivative
with respect to β and substituting in for dp
O
dβ













where D and N indicate the denominator and numerator, respectively, of the expres-
sion in equation 3.9, both of which are positive. Again, knowing that dz¯L
dβ
< 0 from
appendix B.3a, we can sign the whole expression above as negative. Using similar






























Taking the derivative of equation 3.6 with respect to β and again plugging in for dp
O
dβ
















New entrants and existing offshoring firms lower prices more than non-offshoring





implying that for suffi-
ciently small γ, dq
O
dβ
< 0 and production increases with falling offshoring costs. Since
employment is a linear function of quantity, it follows that total employment (domes-
tic and foreign) increases with a fall in offshoring costs.
To determine the effect on domestic employment at these firms note that domestic





While q increases for new and continuing offshorers, we also know that offshoring has
increased for these firms (see appendix B.3a) and hence the net effect is ambiguous.
Let us consider the extreme case where the high skilled jobs are not offshored i.e.




> 0. Thus in the home firm employment of
high skilled labor increases but effect on low skilled labor's employment is ambiguous.








aL(1− z¯L) + aH(1− z¯H)
To see how sOL (the share of unskilled labor in the firm's domestic workforce) is affected
by a fall in the offshoring cost, we again for simplicity look at two extreme cases. First





> 0 in this case. Whereas if there is no offshoring in the low-skilled
sector i.e. z¯L = 0 we can show that
dsOL
dβ





depends on which job ends up being offshored relatively more2.
(g) How the average wage is affected by a fall in the cost of offshoring:























The first expression in the brackets gives the rent sharing effect, which is posi-
tive by appendix B.6e. The second term gives the skill composition effect and its sign








< 0, i.e. relatively more unskilled jobs
are offshored, so the share of skilled labor in domestic firm increases, then skill com-
position effect is positive and reinforces the effect of rent sharing on average wages. If
2Note, increased opportunity for offshoring increases cost savings and as a result enhances firm




> 0, i.e. relatively more unskilled jobs are offshored, so the share of skilled labor
in the domestic firm decreases, then skill composition effect is negative and weakens
the effect of rent sharing on average wages.
B.7 How a Fall in β Affects the Non-offshoring Firms
This section provides proofs of how the firm level variables behave with fall in off-
shoring costs for firms that never offshore. We show that (a) dp
D
dβ
























We recall that theD(pD, β, .) function (equation 3.12) implicitly solves for the optimal


































> 0 captures the partial effect of the demand curve shifting in for all firms
as the price level falls in sector X and can be seen by examining equation 3.6. The
intuition behind this partial effect is that a fall in the marginal cost of offshoring
lowers the price level in sector X and hence shifts in the demand curve for purely
domestic firms.














Thus marginal costs falls as β falls.
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indicating that markups fall in the non-












af (1 + η˜)
> 0

















Taking the derivative of equation 3.6 with respect to β and again plugging in for dp
D
dβ
















New entrants and existing offshoring firms lower prices more than non-offshoring





implying that for suffi-
ciently small γ, dq
D
dβ
> 0 and production decreases with falling offshoring costs. Since
employment is a linear function of quantity, it follows that total employment also
decreases with a fall in offshoring costs in the non-offshoring firms. The ratio of un-
skilled worker to skilled worker remains unchanged given that there is no opportunity
for substitution between the different types of tasks.
(g) How the average wage is affected by a fall in the cost of offshoring



















The expression in the brackets gives the rent sharing effect, which is positive
by appendix B.7e. There is no skill composition effect for the non-offshoring firms
since tasks do not allow for substitution. Thus a fall in the cost of offshoring leads to
a fall in the average wage at the non-offshoring firms.
B.8 The Post Liberalization Equilibrium in the (Π¯; φ¯)
Space
To show that the ZCP condition shifts up following liberalization (i.e. dΠ¯
dβ
< 0).



















(1 + η˜) < 0
Note that equation 3.16, represents a firm with average offshoring. Therefore




The ZCP curve shifts up following liberalization because the direct effect of offshoring
leads to cost savings and increased profitability at the average firm (defined by φ˜).
This is equivalent to higher average industry profits, holding φ¯ constant.
